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CHAPTER 1 
 INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION 
 Organics have progressively become a more popular topic of discussion among 
growers, handlers, retailers, consumers and researchers since the early 1970s as 
consumers become more conscientious about their environment, health and what they are 
really eating.  Consumer demand for organic foods has grown at an annual rate of 
approximately 20 percent through the 1990s compared to only 2 to 3 percent annual 
growth of conventional foods; organic food is one of the fastest growing segments of 
agricultural production (Thompson and Glaser 2001).   
The availability of organics has drastically changed in the wake of increasing 
consumer demand.  Once only available in small natural food stores or farmer’s markets, 
organics are now sold to consumers through three main venues: natural food stores, 
conventional grocery stores, and direct consumer markets also referred to as farmer’s 
markets.  Table 1 on the following page presents definitions of the major retail formats in 
which organics are sold.   
 Suppliers are offering new organic varieties and food retailers are increasing their 
organic product assortment.  The growth in organics is not just in groceries and produce.  
The assortment of organic products has expanded beyond fresh produce to include dairy, 
meats, and a vast variety of processed and convenience foods (Thompson 1998).  Organic 
baby food, pet foods and a variety of personal care items are also being offered in the 
aisles of mainstream supermarkets (Thompson 1998).       
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Table 1.  Major Retail Formats Selling Organic Food Products 
Retail Format Definition 
 
Traditional Grocers 
Conventional 
Supermarket 
Offers a full line of groceries, meat, and produce with at 
least $2 million in annual sales.  These stores typically carry 
approximately 15,000 items and usually offer a deli service. 
Superstore 
A larger version of a traditional supermarket with at least 
40,000 square feet in total selling area and 25,000 items.  
Offer an extended non-food array of items including health 
and beauty products and general merchandise. 
Natural/Specialty 
Supermarket 
Similar to a traditional supermarket dedicated to offering 
organic, specialty and natural products, e.g. Whole Foods. 
Farmer’s Market A public market at which farmers and often other vendors sell produce directly to consumers. 
Non-Traditional Grocers 
Supercenters 
A large food/drug combination store and mass merchandiser 
under a single roof.  They offer a wide variety of food, as 
well as non food merchandise, average more than 170,000 
square feet and typically devote as much as 40 percent to 
grocery items. 
Warehouse 
A low-margin grocery store offering reduced variety, lower 
service levels, and a streamlined merchandising 
presentation, along with lower average prices. 
Wholesale Clubs 
A membership retail/wholesale hybrid with a limited variety 
of products presented in a warehouse type environment.  
These 120,000 sq. foot stores have 30 to 40 percent to 
grocery sales and sell mostly large sizes and bulk sales. 
    Adapted from the USDA/ERS 2005 
 
Fresh organic fruits and vegetables are vital to the organic food sector as they are 
referred to as a “gateway” product group, meaning they are the first organic products 
purchased by consumers (Olberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene, 2005).  In response to 
growing consumer demand, many conventional supermarkets and mass merchandisers 
have added organic produce items to their shelves.  The newest source of competition in 
the organic produce market is nontraditional food retailing supercenters.  The supercenter 
has become a one stop shopping venue for many financially conscientious consumers by 
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combining food retailing with general merchandising.  There are currently 1600 
supercenters throughout the U.S., with Wal-Mart as the leading supercenter retailer 
opening its first supercenter in 1988.     
 As organic food products continue to move into the mainstream food retail 
market, it is becoming more and more important to examine the impact of traditional 
grocers and non-traditional grocers, such as Wal-Mart, entering specific food market 
segments.  Are grocers allowing consumers to further stretch their organic grocery dollar 
or are food retailers increasing their market power to raise food prices overall?  For the 
organic food market, is the influx of these grocers affecting the integrity of organic 
products?   
The major focus of organic market research has been in the arena of supply, 
consumer demand and consumer benefit analysis.  Little quantitative analysis has been 
done on the impact of market expansion and market structure beyond the consumer point 
of view.  A 1996 study conducted by Park and Lohr examined supply and demand factors 
relevant to expected market expansion.  However, given the length of time that has 
elapsed, new issues and impacts relevant to the changing market structure of the organics 
market have developed.   
The USDA’s Economic Research Service (ERS) has conducted rigorous research 
on the produce market and more specifically on the organic produce market.  Dimitri and 
Greene (2003) examined recent growth patterns in the US organic foods market through 
analyses of farm-gate and wholesale prices.  These authors contributed to a further study 
in 2005 analyzing price premiums in the US organic produce market (Olberholtzer, 
Dimitri and Greene, 2005).  Even though the emphasis of these studies remained heavily 
on supply side factors influencing the organic market expansion, they concluded there 
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was steady growth of organic produce that would likely continue into the future.  The 
authors suggested the continued growth into the mainstream market would result in 
diminishing price differentials between organic and conventional food products if 
consumer demand continues to grow.  Moreover, these authors highlighted the 
importance of further research as the organic market continues to grow, specifically at the 
retail price level.   
In this regard it is relevant to explore the impacts of organics moving to the 
mainstream retail market on pricing strategies.  This thesis examines the regional organic 
retail market of traditional and non-traditional grocers, including Super Stop and Shop, 
Whole Foods, Wild Oats, Trader Joe’s and Wal-Mart Supercenters in the four New 
England States of Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island.   A 
regional analysis is important to examine the impact of traditional and non-traditional 
grocers on pricing strategies in relation to changing market structures.  Aggregation of 
prices and quantities on a national level could result in aggregation bias as grocery 
chains, suppliers and consumer demographics vary greatly.  The New England region is 
chosen for its diversified population as well as its abundance of traditional and 
nontraditional grocers.   
For the empirical work of this thesis, the prices of the aforementioned stores are 
recorded and analyzed through an econometric model.  The general objective is to 
determine retail pricing strategies for organic produce across different store formats in 
New England.  This thesis also aims to provide some insight into the specific effect of 
Wal-Mart Supercenters on the retail price of organic produce in New England.  Literature 
suggests the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters results in lower grocery prices overall.  
 5
The data gathered from the food retailers in this thesis include retail price and 
merchandising information for thirteen organic produce items, including the top 11 in 
terms of organic sales.  The data were collected from a sample of seventeen New England 
micro-markets of varying market structures. These micro-markets were formed from the 
metropolitan statistical areas as defined by the US Census.  The varying market structures 
include markets with all store types present, with non-traditional supercenters (Wal-Mart) 
and traditional superstores (Super Stop & Shop), with traditional superstores (Super Stop 
& Shop) and specialty supermarkets (e.g., Whole Foods), and with only traditional 
superstores (Super Stop & Shop) stores.  The existence of different pricing patterns 
among these varying market structures will be examined.  Such patterns constitute a 
natural experiment that may reveal strategic pricing by traditional and nontraditional 
grocers. 
 The primary objectives of this thesis are to: 
1)   To infer pricing strategies of traditional natural/specialty food stores, 
superstores and non-traditional grocers through estimation of average price differences 
across product, store, community and market conditions.  
2)   To determine the effect of market structure on average organic grocery prices, 
holding demographics, product attributes and store conditions constant.  
            3)   To utilize a summary of the effect of non-traditional grocers to infer the 
positive and negative effects of non-traditional grocers on both consumers and competing 
traditional grocers. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
 THE LITERATURE 
 
 This chapter reviews the relevant literature on the mainstream movement of the 
organics market, specifically the organic produce market.  The impacts of organic 
mainstreaming on agriculture, supply chain operations, competition and consumers are 
also detailed.  This is followed by a brief summary of the practices of Wal-Mart and the 
emergence and effects of Wal-Mart Supercenters.  The remaining sections of this chapter 
will discuss the resulting potential impacts on and determinants of supermarket prices. 
 
What is Organic? 
Organic agriculture is based on production processes free of artificial fertilizers, 
pesticides, and genetically modified organisms.  Organic food products rely on 
ecologically based practices including biological pest management and composting 
(Progress 2005).     
In October of 2002, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
implemented the national organic standards, which made it mandatory for organic 
farmers and distributors, who wished to label their products organic, to adhere to a 
uniform set of standards.  The stated purpose of this certification program is to sustain 
and stimulate growth by assuring consumers that organic products meet consistent and 
uniform standards, as well as assuring producers of the ability to achieve price premiums 
and market share for certified organic products.  The certification process is also assumed 
to increase the efficiency of the market by reducing the issue of asymmetric information 
(i.e., sellers know more about product quality than buyers) from producer to consumer 
(Lohr 1998).  As consumer demand for organic foods continues to grow, high volume 
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sales through mass retail outlets, like supermarkets, are rapidly replacing the direct 
farmer connection for organic consumers (USDA/NOP).  For mass market consumers 
labeling like “certified organic” is relied on as food production processes are not easily 
observable (USDA/NOP).  Therefore, consumers look to the national organic standards 
and third-party inspectors for assurance.          
The term organic as recognized by the national organic standards can be broken 
into the following four main categories: “100% organic” products contain only 
organically produced ingredients; “organic” products contain 95 percent organically 
produced ingredients by weight; “made with organic ingredients” products contain more 
than 70 percent organic ingredients, where up to three of the organically produced 
ingredients can be specified on the principal display panel of the packaging; and 
processed products containing less than 70 percent organically produced ingredients. The 
latter category cannot use the term organic in the principal display panel, but the 
ingredients organically produced can be specified on the ingredients statement on the 
information panel (USDA/NOP).     
 
The Mainstream Movement of the Organic Market 
Organics are now available in 20,000 natural food stores and 73 percent of 
traditional grocery stores; they account for one to two percent of total food sales (Dimitri 
and Greene 2003).  Approximately 800 new organic products were introduced in the first 
half of 2000 (Dimitri and Greene 2003).   
Until 2000, natural food and specialty stores accounted for the largest amount of 
organic retail sales followed by direct market sales.  Figure 1 shows that in 1991 only 
seven percent of total organic sales were sold by conventional retailers, including 
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supermarkets and 
superstores, and 68 percent 
were sold by natural and 
specialty food markets 
(Greene and Dimitri 2003).  
By 2000, conventional 
retailers accounted for 49 
percent of organic sales 
followed by 48 percent sold 
by natural and specialty 
food stores and only three 
percent by direct farmer’s 
markets (other in figure 1).  These figures were 47 percent, 44 percent and nine percent 
respectively in 2003.  Approximately half of the $7.8 billion spent on organics in 2000 
was in conventional supermarkets.  Farmer’s markets and other direct sales venues 
increased their market share to nine percent in 2003 (Greene and Dimitri 2003).  The fast 
growth pattern in organic sales is expected to continue and many profit seeking 
companies will jump into the market.  
 
Organic Produce  
 Fresh produce has consistently been an important component in the organic food 
sector as it is a “gateway” product group, meaning it is the first organic product 
purchased by consumers (Olberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene, 2005).  Increasing consumer 
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demand for organics has led to both traditional and non-traditional grocers adding organic 
fruits and vegetables to their shelves.   
 The leading revenue source for the U.S. organic food sector is produce. The 
Nutrition Business Journal states that organic produce accounted for as much as 42 
percent of total U.S. sales of organic foods in 2003, at an estimated value of $4.3 billion.  
Within the organic produce sector, fresh produce accounted for the largest amount at 93 
percent of total sales at $4.0 billion.  Frozen, canned and dried produce each accounted 
for only 3 percent or less (Olberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene, 2005).  In 2005, the organic 
produce sector generated total revenues of approximately $7 billion, amounting to 43 
percent of the overall market value (B&CRC 2006).  Furthermore, the Nutrition Business 
Journal projects sales of organic produce in 2010 could reach $8.5 billion.  This would be 
an increase of more than 300 percent over sales of organic fruits and vegetables in 2000. 
 The top 11 fresh organic produce items purchased in the United States are 
tomatoes, romaine, spinach, carrots, red delicious apples, golden delicious apples, gala 
apples, potatoes, peaches, bananas, and squash (Olberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene, 2005).   
These top selling products, except for peaches due to seasonality, are the products 
analyzed for this thesis.  Other high demand produce items include strawberries, beans, 
mushrooms, cantaloupe, celery, broccoli, and oranges. 
 In addition to increasing the availability of organic produce, retailers, 
predominantly traditional and non-traditional grocers, are also increasing the assortment 
to include packaged produce items (Dimitri and Greene 2003).  From 2002-2003, the 
sales of packaged fresh produce increased to $364 million, the highest growth rate of all 
organic products at 26 percent.   Conventional supermarkets, such as Super Stop and 
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Shop, accounted for 75 percent of this total.  The number of new organic produce items 
has doubled from 14 in 1993 to 30 in 2003 (Oberholtzer, Dimitri, and Greene 2005).      
 The introduction of packaged organic produce items has led the way for the 
branding of fresh produce.  The phenomenon of branding has become more evident as 
more and more producers are identifying their products with their farm name and logo.  
The most prevalent brands are Cal Organic, Pure Veg, and Earthbound Farms, which are 
all California based (Olberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene, 2005).  Earthbound Farms is the 
nation’s largest organic produce brand.   
 The importance of the organic food sector is further noted as it has sparked 
tremendous research by industry groups and academics.  The primary focus of industry 
group research in this arena focuses on consumer behavior and preferences towards 
purchasing organic produce through consumer surveying.  The Nutrition Business 
Journal (2003) examined usage and expenditure surveys in relation to retail and 
wholesale data to determine the degree to which consumers were buying organic 
products.  The study concluded that only 2.4 percent of the U.S. population is frequent or 
heavy consumers of organic food.  Frequent is defined by a consumer spending $50 a 
month and a heavy consumer is one who spends $200 a month on organic food.  
The Whole Foods Market survey (2004) reports that 54 percent of U.S. consumers 
have at least tried organic foods and beverages and more than 25 percent claim they have 
consumed more organics in 2004 than in the previous year.  Additionally, the survey 
indicates that one in every ten U.S. consumers consumes organic foods and beverages 
regularly or several times a week. 
The Hartman Group’s 1999 survey concluded that 3 percent of all consumers are 
“heavy” purchasers and 29 percent are “light” purchasers of organic food products.  The 
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survey revealed that organic fruits and vegetables fall within the top three most purchased 
organic products for both heavy and light consumers.  Heavy consumers rated vegetables 
second and fruits third most purchased.  Light users rated vegetables first and fruits 
second most purchased.   
 Consumer surveys were also used to identify important factors that influence the 
purchase of organic produce.  For instance, Makatouni (2002) attempted to capture the 
motivations behind buying organic produce through consumer interviews.  This study 
revealed that human, animal and the environment were the three leading motivating 
factors to buying organic produce.  The Whole Foods Market survey (2004) reports the 
four leading factors behind purchasing fresh organic produce are environmental issues 
(58%), sustaining local agriculture (57%), health concerns (54%) and better quality 
(42%).  The Hartman Group (1999) found health and nutrition (66%), taste (38%), food 
safety (30%) and the environment (26%) are the motivating factors for the purchase of 
organic food products by survey respondents. 
Academic studies have utilized empirical analysis to complement the 
aforementioned surveys to examine the typical organic consumer and the inherent 
consumer choice model.  Estes and Smith (1996) concluded that consumers consider 
price, size, packaging, cosmetic defects and whether the product is organic to be 
important in their purchasing of fresh produce.   
 Thompson and Kidwell (1998) also estimated the choice between organic and 
conventional produce, with a focus on produce price, cosmetic defects, consumer 
demographics and economic traits.  They concluded that store choice had a significant 
impact on the probability of purchasing organic produce over conventional.  
Additionally, the authors determined that shoppers at specialty stores were more sensitive 
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to price differences between organic and conventional produce items.  Differences in 
cosmetic defects was statistically significant, but only had a small effect on the 
probability of purchasing organic produce items. 
 
Agricultural Impacts 
The movement of organics to the mainstream market is expected to have impacts 
on organic farmers and producer welfare.  In response to changing supply and demand 
forces, farmers doubled organic cropland between 1992 and 1997, to 1.3 million acres 
and further to approximately 2.3 million acres in 2001 (Dimitri and Greene 2003).  
During the time period of 1992 to 1997 the number of organic growers increased by 40 
percent.  An estimated 80 percent of organic production came from family farms in 2002.  
Organic food products have earned price premiums over conventional (non-organic) food 
products, providing incentives for farmers to grow organic, at least in the short run 
(Oberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene 2005).  However, the process of bringing organically 
grown food to the market is difficult as organic produce is highly sensitive to natural 
variations of weather and seasonality (Resnick 2003).  Therefore, the assumed high profit 
margin associated with certified organic foods is not easily attainable.   
The national standards implemented by the US government are criticized by some 
as favoring corporations as they are too expensive for the average, small farmer to afford.  
The fees charged by State and private certifiers represent an additional, ongoing expense 
in certified organic farming systems, which can be a financial burden for smaller farmers 
(Oberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene 2005).   As a result once valued as being community 
and locally oriented, organic farming has taken on a corporate face (Resnick 2003).  The 
New York Times reports that organic food is seen for its profit making potential.  This 
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has resulted in approximately five corporately owned giant farms being estimated to 
control half of the $400 million organic produce market in California, which is the largest 
organic produce market in the US.  In fact, the majority of space dedicated to organic 
products in the average supermarket is dominated by corporately owned organic brands.  
Phil Howard, a researcher at the Centre for Agro-ecology and Sustainable Food Systems, 
notes that an estimated 40% of the packaged organic foods on the shelves of natural food 
stores are produced by some of the biggest companies in the world (Lindsay 2005).  
According to the New York Times, Hain which owns brands such as Bearitos (chips), 
Bread Shop (granola), Celestial Seasonings (tea), Garden of Eatin', Health Valley, 
Imagine Foods (Rice Dream), Terra Chips, and Westbrae (canned vegetables, soy drinks, 
pastas, and more) has principal stockholders like Phillip Morris (tobacco), Monsanto 
(genetically modified food), Citigroup (responsible for rainforest destruction), 
Exxon/Mobil, Wal-Mart, Entergy Nuclear, and Lockheed Martin (weapons 
manufacturer). In 1999 the H.J. Heinz Co., which is owned by the same principal 
stockholders as Hain, acquired ownership of nearly 20% of Hain (Resnick 2003).   
 This corporate phenomenon has been viewed as both a success and a failure.  
According to many critics, the acreage of organic farmland has increased but the core, 
community-oriented ideals of the organic movement, which were developed in response 
to industrial agriculture, have been slipping away raising the issue of organic integrity 
(Klonsky 1998).  Organic agriculture is increasingly beginning to mimic global, 
industrial agriculture.  Corporate farms are setting “organic” fields alongside 
conventional farming fields, including those which use genetically modified seeding 
practices (Klonsky 1998).  An organic Canadian farmer was quoted saying, “Even though 
a 50-acre field of broccoli may not be sprayed with noxious chemicals, it is still mono-
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cropped, mechanically harvested and transported thousands of miles before it is eaten” 
(Lindsay 2005). The movement to industrial organic farming is likely to share the same 
negative impacts of loss of crop and seed diversity that conventional farming 
experienced.  This has already become evident as Howard notes that many of the organic 
seed varieties are now available only through a giant seed company called Seminis, 
which was acquired by Monsanto in the beginning of 2005.   
Critics argue that many of the small local farmers who brought the value of 
organic farming practices to public attention have been unable to survive the onslaught of 
corporate competition as organic growing has been industrialized and organic products 
have further developed in the mainstream market.  Before supermarkets began stocking 
organic produce, it was bought either directly from farmers or from small local natural 
food stores (Lindsay 2005).  A garlic farmer in British Columbia was reported saying, 
“The (supermarket) chains aren’t interested in buying from small, local, seasonal 
producers anymore” (Lindsay 2005).  It is more cost effective for retail food chains to 
purchase from large organic producing companies.  Critics argue that large companies are 
able to undercut the small organic producers by selling one organic product at a low price 
by subsidizing it with a line-up of non-organic products (Lindsay 2005).  Furthermore, 
most consumers do not distinguish between local and corporate organic foods. A 
common consumer attitude is if it's organic, it's good.  This consumer attitude applies to 
foods shipped from Mexico or Europe, even though domestic products are available 
(Lindsay 2005).  Many consumers’ main concerns are finding the lowest possible price.  
These factors have raised concerns that the niche market for small organic farmers will 
potentially disappear.   
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Supply Chain Impacts 
Organic food products, whether they are fresh or processed, pass through many 
different channels in a variety of ways as seen in Table 2 below.  In some cases one firm 
may grow, process, package and ship their organic products.  In other cases a firm grows 
the product or ingredient for a product, processed by another firm, packaged by a third 
firm, and shipped to its final destination by yet another firm (Oberholtzer, Dimitri and 
Greene 2005).  After shipping, organic products can either be sold to retailers by a broker 
or delivered to a terminal wholesale market where they will then be sold to retailers.  
Organic produce, however, is typically sold to a specialty broker rather than a terminal 
wholesale market.  It is important for organic food handlers, processors and retailers to 
adhere to standards to maintain the integrity of organic agricultural products.  To 
maintain organic integrity, organic produce must be processed, stored and shipped 
separately from conventional produce at each stage of the supply chain.  This can be a 
difficult challenge as farmers need to sell their perishable products as soon as possible 
after harvesting, while brokers and distributors need to get their fresh products to retailers 
just as quickly. 
Organic food products were previously sold largely outside the traditional 
distribution channels through farm gate sales, open-air markets, specialized grocery 
shops, and natural product retailers (Kortbech-Olesen 2002).  Most processing took place 
in small or medium sized companies rather than major food manufacturers.  As organics 
have moved to the mainstream retail market, these traditional distribution channels have 
begun to change.  According to the Washington Post, Wal-Mart is in the process of 
developing a national organic and fair trade program starting in Brazil.  The initiative of 
the program is to purchase organic and fair trade products directly from farmer co-ops.   
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Table 2. Organic Product Supply Chains 
Organic Fresh Fruits and Vegetables 
Farm – shipper – wholesaler – conventional/natural foods retailer 
Farm – shipper – specialty broker – retailer 
Farm – shipper – conventional/natural foods retailer 
Farm – consumer farmers markets, roadside stands, community supported agriculture 
Processed Organic Foods 
Farm – manufacturer – wholesaler – retailer 
Farm – shipper/procurer – manufacturer – wholesaler – retailer 
Organic Dairy Products 
Farm – on-farm/off-farm dairy (pasteurize and bottle) – regional distributor – retailer 
Farm – off-farm processors of cheese, butter, yogurt, or dry milk – distributor – retailer 
          Adapted from the USDA/ERS     
It is known that fair trade and organic co-ops tend to have higher than average prices.  
Wal-Mart contests they will not pay more for these products than they deem necessary.  
However, the company was quoted saying they are willing to pay slightly higher than 
average prices because they will save money by bypassing the traditional layers of the 
distribution chain.  Wal-Mart will make room for these new products by bumping pricier 
name brand products on their shelves.  This is expected to allow Wal-Mart to buy 
products more cost effectively and ultimately sell them at lower prices.  Additionally, 
Wal-Mart hopes to better their image with consumers by showing their support for 
organic and fair trade co-ops and sustainability.        
Trade practices between produce shippers and retailers have gained national 
attention in the recent wave of supermarket mergers and the growth of new trade 
practices that have affected various industries, specifically the produce industry 
(Kaufman 2000).  The USDA Economic Research Service has conducted thorough 
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research on the emerging trade practices, trends and issues of the U.S. produce market 
including both conventional and organic produce.  Retail consolidation has prompted 
concerns about whether retail buyers are exerting market power in their relationship with 
produce shippers, specifically reducing prices to shippers below competitive levels along 
with a growing incidence of fees and services (Kaufman 2000). Retailers argue that these 
new trade practices reflect their costs of doing business and the demands of consumers.  
 
Impact on Competition 
The Nutrition Business Journal states organic foods accounted for $10.4 billion 
(1.8 percent) of total US food retail sales in 2003.  By 2010 organic food sales are 
predicted to increase to $23.8 billion or 3.5 percent of total retail US food sales.  
Presently the largest share of organic sales takes place through two major retailers: 
natural food stores and traditional supermarkets (Kortbech-Olesen 2002).  Both retailers 
sell organic products but do so in a different manner.  Natural food stores focus primarily 
on organic products and usually offer conventional products when organic product 
availability is limited (Kortbech-Olesen 2002).  Traditional supermarkets differ by 
offering a limited selection of organic products usually alongside a vast assortment of 
conventional food products.  More recently traditional supermarkets have developed their 
own organic product lines and departments.   
In addition to selling their organic products under different formats, these major 
retailers also obtain their products through different channels.  Natural food stores tend to 
not import their organic products, but rather obtain them through local or regional 
distributors (Kortbech-Olesen 2002).  This way they maintain the original local 
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community values tied to the organic movement.  In contrast, traditional grocers obtain 
their organic products through direct importing at a higher rate.    
The organic food sector has undergone a consolidation process through mergers 
and acquisitions.  In the early 1980s mass market natural food stores, such as Whole 
Foods, capitalized on the rising demand for organic products, gobbling up local natural 
food stores (Warner 2005).  Whole Foods is the largest and fastest growing grocery chain 
of natural and organic food products with 177 stores and 1 percent of the food market in 
the US.  It has changed the landscape of supermarkets by pushing for more variety of 
organic foods (Warner 2005).  To compete, conventional supermarkets reduced organic 
prices by subsidizing them with other products and direct importation of their organic 
products (Lindsay 2005).  However, Lindsay argues that conventional supermarkets were 
too quick to do this without considering long run implications and cost structures.  
Organic food products cost more to produce and, if retailers squeeze farmers too tightly, 
corners will be cut and organic integrity will be compromised. 
The advancement of organics to mainstream traditional supermarkets resulted in 
numerous studies focused on the demand impacts of organic foods.  Most of the first 
studies done measured demand impacts through examination of consumer attitudes and 
choice models.  A series of studies conducted by Glaser and Thompson were of the first 
to consider price and purchase data for estimation of changing demand for organic 
products (Thompson and Glaser 1998, 2000, 2001).  The results supported the increasing 
demand for organic products and found that price premiums for organic foods were as 
much as 60 percent higher than for comparable conventional food products in some 
organic market segments at the supermarket level.  The authors recognize a limitation in 
the amount of organic scanner data available as well as the limitation of not including 
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natural food stores.  This study along with numerous others suggests that price premiums 
for organic products have been maintained at the traditional supermarket level.  The 
research at the traditional supermarket level is rigorous in its analysis comparing the 
organic food market to the conventional market.  However, research needs to be taken a 
step further to explore the impacts of the increase in consumer demand and the inclusion 
of nontraditional grocers.     
 
Wal-Mart Supercenters 
The movement to a corporate organic retail face opened an important opportunity 
for not only traditional grocers but also for non-traditional grocers to gain some organic 
ground.  Traditional grocers are losing market share as discount and other mass market 
formats grow.  The average American made 95 trips to traditional supermarkets in 1996.  
In 2004 it dropped to 70 trips.  From 1996 to 2004, annual trips to Wal-Mart jumped to 
26 from 13 and Costco to 11 from 8 (Warner 2005).  Wal-Mart operates 1,866 
supercenters with grocery departments, which could triple by 2010 (Warner 2005).  
Target also plans to incorporate grocery departments into more of its stores.  Twenty 
years ago traditional supermarkets held 90 percent of at-home food purchases.  Now Wal-
Mart, Costco and Target, all non-traditional grocery stores, have grabbed substantial 
market share with their consumer-enticing one-stop shopping image (Leibtag 2005).  
In March 2006, Wal-Mart revealed it would double its organic produce and dairy 
selections.   Wal-Mart is already the top U.S. grocery seller and the top seller of organic 
milk. Wal-Mart also offers organic products including baby food, juice, produce and 
pasta sauce, but the expanded offerings will include products ranging from pickles to 
macaroni and cheese (Health and Nutrition 2006).   Wal-Mart is now testing 300 so-
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called "organic trait stores," across the country and is also in the process of rolling out 
400-plus organic items across all departments in its stores, including food and nonfood 
items (McTaggart 2006).  To compete, supermarkets are devoting as much as 30 percent 
of their floor space to organic, natural and specialty foods (Purcell 2006).   
Wal-Mart's further development into the organics market is likely to drive more 
production of organic foods by manufacturers who generally have viewed organics as 
risky because of low market share, as well as among manufacturers that previously would 
not have dealt with retailers such as Wal-Mart (Health and Nutrition 2006).  For instance 
the brand Nature's Path emphasized the importance of recognizing that 45 percent of the 
U.S. population shops at Wal-Mart, and they may not otherwise have access to organics 
(McTaggart 2006).  By selling to Wal-Mart, Nature’s Path is servicing more than 145 
million people they were not servicing before (McTaggart 2006).  This allows their 
products to be available to everyone of every social and economic background. 
As with other products, Wal-Mart has begun its mission to become the low-price 
leader in organics.  Wal-Mart is executing its buying power and efficient supply chain 
tactics to drive down the price premiums on organics to be within 10 percent of 
conventional food products (McTaggart 2006).  As stated above, numerous studies show 
Wal-Mart has contributed to reducing consumer prices.  This effect of Wal-Mart has 
already made an impact on the UK organic food industry as supermarkets are fighting to 
reduce the price of organic food by further importing organic food products even when 
domestic products are available (Speveck 2006).  This competitive strategy may make it 
less likely for small organic farmers to survive. 
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Impact on Competition 
A standard assumption in most economic models is that a firm’s primary 
objective is to maximize profit (Perloff 2005).  As previously discussed, the organics 
market is seen to have profit making potential as demand has continued to grow at an 
increasing rate.  Given the laws of supply and demand under perfect competition, firms 
will continue to enter a market or a specific market segment as long as there is potential 
to make profit.  A firm will not enter if it is unprofitable to do so especially when barriers 
to entry are present.  There are currently no entry restrictions in the organics market, in 
the sense that only a certain number of firms can exist and compete within the market.  
However, there are significant barriers or costs to entering the organic market.  For 
example, certification is necessary for an organic farmer; adhering to the national organic 
standards is required and can be costly.  Due to the associated risk and costs, changing 
from conventional to organic agricultural practices may be more easily attained by larger 
corporate farms (Resnick 2003).   
Economic theory suggests that if an entry restriction is high enough to prevent 
entry to the level of perfect competition, prices will be sustained at a level exceeding 
marginal cost and average cost (Perloff 2005).  The presence of large traditional grocers 
and Wal-Mart Supercenters in the organics market may present additional barriers to 
entry for retailers.  Cost structures of the firms present in the organics market are 
unknown; however, it is common for large incumbent firms to hold cost advantages over 
potential entrants.  Additionally, a 1992 study by Cotterill and Haller demonstrated the 
supermarket industry to be one inclined to use strategic barriers to entry, such as filling 
niche markets like organics and reducing retail prices.  Interestingly in the organic retail 
market, Wal-Mart, which is specifically known for the large economies of scale it creates 
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from its efficient supply chain operations and influential buying power, is the entrant.  
These economies of scale are not typically shared by the traditional incumbent grocers.  
Wal-Mart’s entry into the organics market as in other industries has made it difficult for 
incumbent firms to compete and for the entry of potential competitors. 
Theoretical and empirical work suggests that entry of a new firm leads to a 
decrease in market prices and the profits of incumbent firms (Volpe and Lavoie 2007).  
However, research has determined that the effects of entry into an industry are heavily 
dependent upon market conditions, such as competitiveness and number of incumbent 
firms (Volpe and Lavoie 2007).  A 1991 study conducted by Bresnahan and Reiss 
demonstrated that in competitive markets the first and second entrants into an industry 
resulted in a price decrease, but additional entrants resulted in little or no price difference.  
However, their study assumed identical firms and Wal-Mart supercenters are considered 
to be quite different to conventional supermarkets (Volpe and Lavoie 2007).  Further 
research by Marion, Heimforth and Bailey in 1993 specifically focused on the effects of 
supercenters and warehouse stores entering retail food markets.  The authors concluded 
that supercenters and warehouse stores may enhance price rivalry among nearby 
competition because these stores behave strategically different from conventional grocers 
with a major emphasis on low price markups.  Lower prices through competition may 
reduce barriers to entry imposed by incumbent grocers (Volpe and Lavoie 2007).  
However, the reduction in price through increased competition may also reduce the 
incentive to enter as the profit making potential of organics may diminish.   
Over the past decade nontraditional grocers have chipped away at market share of 
traditional grocers.  In the past five years Wal-Mart sold almost twice as much as 
Kroger’s, the largest grocery chain.  Wal-Mart began selling food in 1988 and by 2002 
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became the largest grocery chain in the US (Hausman and Leibtag 2005).  Wal-Mart 
undercuts supermarket prices by as much as 20 percent, but manages to maintain 
significant profits because of its enormous volume, huge buying power and low labor 
costs, as its employees unlike those of most supermarkets are not unionized (Warner 
2005).  Traditional retail outlets have responded to the entry of Wal-Mart supercenters by 
reducing their prices and employee wages and benefits (Hausman and Leibtag 2005).   
The impact of Wal-Mart on traditional food retailers has been the center of much 
discussion and research for the past several years. The Food System Research Group 
published a study measuring the impact of nontraditional food retailing supercenters on 
food price changes, with a specific focus on market concentration and market power 
(Sharkey 2006).  The study confirmed that as the concentration within a market increases 
higher food prices are to be expected.  However, the study could not conclude that the 
entry of supercenters into a market had a significant impact on food prices in 
metropolitan areas due to limitations in data (Sharkey 2006).  The authors suspect that a 
smaller geographic breakdown of markets would reveal a more significant effect of 
supercenters on price. 
Khanna and Tice (2000) examined how large chain stores respond to new entry of 
Wal-Mart discount stores in local markets through the comparison of markets with and 
without conventional Wal-Marts present.  Consistent with previous research, the authors 
concluded that large, highly profitable incumbents responded aggressively through price 
competition to Wal-Mart’s entry, while highly levered incumbents responded less 
aggressively.  Among the incumbents who responded aggressively, the following three 
characteristics were present: 1) public ownership, 2) low levels of debt, and 3) little or no 
exposure to Wal-Mart in other regions.  The success or failure of the incumbents’ 
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response was not discussed.  However, Khanna and Tice suggest in addition to price 
incumbents also respond to Wal-Mart’s entry through investment.  For example, the 
incumbent may renovate, expand, or increase the number of current stores.  Furthermore, 
the authors concluded that firms who previously competed with Wal-Mart were more 
likely to compete through investment rather than price. 
This research reveals several important factors to consider when attempting to 
understand the effect of Wal-Mart’s entry on the prices of competing supermarkets.  
Therefore the following factors should be considered to explain price reactions to the 
presence of a Wal-Mart Supercenter by different stores: the size of competing 
supermarkets, status of public or private ownership, level of debt incurred by incumbents, 
and the existence of previous exposure to competition with Wal-Mart (Volpe and Lavoie 
2007).         
Volpe measured the effect of Wal-Mart Supercenters on grocery prices in New 
England.  He examined 12 geographic markets throughout New England collecting price 
data on national brand and private label goods for an identical market basket across 
traditional supermarkets and Wal-Mart Supercenters.  The market basket included goods 
from all six major grocery departments – dairy, frozen food, grocery, health and beauty, 
meat, and produce.  Volpe concluded the Wal-Mart Supercenters resulted in a price 
decrease of approximately 7 percent for national brand goods and approximately a 5 
percent decrease for private label goods at conventional supermarkets within a five mile 
radius.  The presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters results in the greatest price decreases in 
the grocery and dairy departments of conventional supermarkets.  There was also 
evidence to suggest the presence of Supercenters results in price decreases in the frozen 
food and produce departments.   
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Additionally Volpe suggests that the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters results in 
greater price variation among supermarkets with which it competes.  Volpe offers two 
explanations for this result.  First, the presence of Supercenters may reduce the ability of 
conventional supermarkets to coordinate pricing and promotional activities.  Second is 
the presence of non-price competition as some competing supermarkets may compete 
with Wal-Mart through differentiating their service and product quality level.  Therefore, 
greater price variation does not clearly suggest a positive or negative effect by the 
presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters.  Moreover, Volpe concluded that regardless of 
market concentration, Wal-Mart Supercenters price their products significantly lower 
than conventional supermarkets.   
 
Impact on Consumers 
The impact of organics moving to the mainstream is also felt by consumers.  The 
Whole Foods Market survey (2004) reveals the primary barrier to consumers trying 
organics is price.  Almost 73 percent of respondents believed organics were too 
expensive.  A 2006 study confirms this belief through the comparison of organic and 
conventional average grocery prices for meat, milk, fruits and vegetables and a few select 
pantry staple goods in Portland, Oregon.  The study concluded that organics were priced 
approximately 77 percent higher than comparable conventional goods (Cole 2006).   
Additionally, Oberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene (2005) analyzed price premiums 
for the expanding US organic produce market.  This study emphasizes the significant and 
increasing growth of the organic produce market through the analysis of farm-gate and 
wholesale prices.  They specifically looked at the pricing trends and market margins for 
broccoli, carrots and mesclun mix.  They concluded organic wholesale price premiums 
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for mesclun mix are narrowing, while wholesale and farm-gate premiums for broccoli 
and carrots remain strong.  Oberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene (2005) indicate that organic 
prices and premiums have been already shown to have decreased but must decrease 
further to penetrate beyond the 2-3 percent level in the mainstream market.   
The entry of Wal-Mart into the organics market is perceived to further decrease 
these price premiums as both theoretical and empirical evidence suggests Wal-Mart 
stores result in lower average prices in areas in which they operate.  Global Insight 2005 
conducted a statistical analysis that supports these findings.  They concluded the 
expansion of Wal-Mart during the period of 1985 to 2004 was associated with a 9% 
decline in food-at-home prices, a 4% decline in commodity prices and a 3% decline in 
overall consumer prices as measured by the Consumer Price Index.  Bianco and Zellner 
(2003) found that Wal-Mart Supercenters, as with conventional Wal-Mart stores, price 
their products significantly lower than competitors.  Volpe (2005) concluded that, in 
addition to having lower prices, Wal-Mart Supercenters have also been shown to lower 
the prices of their competitors, having a positive effect on price sensitive consumers.  
 Most national studies suggest higher income consumers are more likely to 
purchase more organic products (Thompson 1998).  Wal-Mart’s entry may mean that 
consumers in lower income brackets have more opportunity to purchase organic products 
as they become more affordable.      
  Wal-Mart’s enormous size and consistent innovation in distribution and 
inventory control efficiencies has allowed the firm the ability to buy in bulk.  Moreover, 
Wal-Mart has been able to sustain substantial bargaining power with its suppliers by 
buying from many different firms over time to ensure the lowest possible price for its 
goods (Vance and Scott, 1994).  Volpe (2007) discusses the ability of Wal-Mart to 
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achieve low prices through bargaining as a demonstration of countervailing power.  The 
concept of countervailing power is the ability of a retailer to offset the increasing market 
power of its distributor in order to extract wholesale price discounts resulting in a 
reduction in the distributor’s markup (Snyder 2005).  Chen (2003) demonstrates that an 
increase in the amount of countervailing power possessed by a dominant retailer, such as 
Wal-Mart, can lead to a reduction in average retail prices for consumers.  A dominant 
retailer has market power and acts as a price setter.  The presence of a competitive fringe, 
a set of small firms acting as price takers, is necessary for countervailing power to benefit 
consumers.  The intuition behind this result is that in order for a distributor to cope with 
the loss due to the dominant firm’s bargaining power, the distributor decreases the 
wholesale price to the firms among the competitive fringe as well.  Thus, there is an 
overall reduction in price to consumers in the presence of a countervailing power under 
certain market conditions.     
Some speculate that lower prices at Wal-Mart may not be a consumer benefit.  
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that a price reduction may not in fact be a 
consumer benefit if along with a price reduction consumers also experience a reduction in 
service.  Therefore, consumers are thought to pay less for less service.  In contrast 
Hausman and Leibtag (2005) assert that the consumer benefit is felt through an indirect 
price effect: as the expenditures at a supercenter increase the prices of traditional grocers 
tend to decrease.  Hausman and Leibtag conclude that consumers benefit from direct and 
indirect price effects of Wal-Mart Supercenter entry.    
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Competition in the Supermarket Industry 
This section reviews the relevant literature on the level of competition in the 
supermarket industry.  The relationship between market structure and grocery prices is 
vital in the formation of econometric models that aim to explain variations in food prices.  
Although there is limited research specifically on organic pricing patterns in relation to 
market structure, there is extensive research on conventional food prices in relation to 
market structure.   
Several studies, Lamm (1981), Cotterill (1986), Marion (1998) and Yu and 
Connor (2002), have found positive relationships between concentration levels and retail 
food prices.  Lamm (1981) examined the price-structure relationship by regressing the 
value of a market basket on concentration ratios for various numbers of food retailing 
firms.  Cotterrill (1986) performed a similar study using the Herfindahl index to measure 
concentration and predict food prices.  Both studies conclude prices are significantly and 
positively correlated with concentration in the local markets they analyzed.  Cotterill 
determined the Herfindahl index, which is a measure of concentration calculated by 
summing the squares of the market shares of all competing firms in an industry, to be 
more effective in predicting prices than concentration ratios.  Cotterill also determined 
that smaller supermarket chains and independent stores may have higher prices than 
larger, prominent supermarkets.  Furthermore, Cotterill concluded prices are positively 
correlated with store size and capacity.  Further research by Cotterill and Putsis in 2000 
supports the earlier findings of a positive correlation between price and concentration.   
 Conflicting research shows that the relationship between market price and 
concentration may not always hold.  Kaufman and Handy (1989) examined 616 
supermarkets across 28 Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) and concluded there was 
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no relationship between market concentration and retail food prices.  The authors did 
suggest the use of MSAs could mask otherwise positive concentration-price relationships 
in areas that are large enough to have multiple submarkets.  However, Geithman and 
Marion (1993) disagree with Kaufman and Handy’s use of an average price 
measurement, suggesting that prices of identical products should be compared across 
stores and across markets.  Furthermore, Geithman and Marion (1993) revealed that the 
supermarkets were notified by the researchers prior to data collection, which could have 
resulted in “adjusted” prices.   
 Newmark (1990) found negative, but insignificant, coefficients for four firm 
concentration in the analysis of market basket prices across 27 cities.  Even though 
Newmark found no relationship between concentration and price, he did find a positive 
significant relationship between price and income.  However, Yu and Connor (2002) 
suggest that Newmark’s study contained measurement errors for both the dependent price 
variable and the independent variables.  After Yu and Connor (2002) corrected the 
measurement errors, Newmark’s data revealed a positive and significant concentration-
to-price relationship. 
A 1998 study conducted by Binkley and Connor examined the price-concentration 
relationships across different U.S. markets, while controlling for variables related to 
supermarket costs, such as labor cost and store size.  The authors found evidence to 
suggest the nature of retail market competition affects different price groupings in 
different ways.  For instance, concentration was found to affect price, negatively and 
insignificantly to price in store departments such as produce, dairy and meat, but 
positively and significantly in other grocery departments, especially dry goods.  The 
authors concluded that store size was a significant predictor of grocery prices, as larger 
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stores with more floor space tended to have lower prices than smaller supermarkets.  
Furthermore, Binkley and Connor (1998) determined that supermarkets reacted to 
warehouse store competition by lowering their prices.          
 The relationship between market structure and performance is important when 
analyzing the movement of organics to the mainstream market.   The consolidation trend 
of supermarkets and the inclusion of Wal-Mart have resulted in an increase in market 
concentration in the retail food industry (Business Resource Center 2005).  Economic 
theory and most research, as previously discussed, suggests that a premium would remain 
on organic products and be higher at higher levels of concentration.  However, Wal-Mart 
is known to reduce prices and Volpe’s research suggests that in the presence of Wal-
Mart, regardless of concentration levels, grocery prices are lower.  Therefore, when 
considering the links between structure, conduct and performance in the grocery industry, 
an increase in market concentration and the influence of market power may lead to lower 
prices possibly resulting from an increase in efficiency (Shy 1995).      
 
Organic Integrity 
As organic sales have moved into mainstream retail markets, conventional food 
industry corporations are becoming more involved with the organic movement.  This may 
bring the integrity of organic quality into question with the transformation of the organic 
farming landscape.  Movement to the mainstream market is important in securing the 
growth of the organic market sector in the long run as long as it does not compromise 
organic integrity.  At least two primary issues are involved in discussing organic 
integrity: compliance to organic standards and maintaining the core values of the organic 
movement.  In discussing compliance with standards, the national organic standards state 
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that manufacturers, distributors, handlers and retailers “must perform due diligence to be 
sure that products they label and sell as organic are indeed organic” (USDA/NOP).  Food 
retailers are responsible for maintaining the organic integrity of organic products, but 
they do not need to be certified under the USDA’s standards in order to sell organic 
agricultural products (USDA/NOP).  Consumers want high quality fresh products at low 
prices.  Organic consumers want food that was not only grown organically but has also 
kept its organic integrity along its journey to the retailer.  Organic consumers do not just 
consider price and quality, but also the perceived social and environmental benefits 
associated with buying organic (Dimitri and Richman 2000). 
The maintenance of the core values of the organic movement is pertinent to the 
discussion of organic integrity.  Under the USDA standards organic is organic, but is the 
foundation of the organic movement being compromised in the movement to the 
mainstream market?  The increasing presence of conventional food processors in the 
organic industry is increasing debate among farmers, shoppers, and consumer advocates 
about whether the values of organic agriculture and the motives of corporate development 
can coexist (Mark 2004).  The roots of the organic movement stemmed from the 
promotion of sustainable, community oriented farming practices.  A common 
promotional logo was “Know your farmer, know your food”.  Organic foods once 
available only at local co-ops or local health food stores can now be found at Safeway, 
Albertsons, Kroger's and Wal-Mart.  A significant and growing percentage of organic 
foods are marketed by corporations, whom critics argue are more often associated with 
the predations of agribusiness than with the ideals of sustainable agriculture (Mark 2004).  
Organic produce that could be grown locally, like potatoes, carrots or apples, is imported 
and/or trucked from thousands of miles away to arrive on supermarket shelves.  Already, 
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85 percent of organic food in Canada is imported (Lindsay 2005).  In the US, organic 
produce is the largest product group traded and the majority of it is domestic (Kortbech-
Olesen 2002).   However, a considerable portion (estimated at 10 percent) of organic 
foods are imported in the US today (Warner 2005).  The exact value of imported organic 
produce is unknown but the USDA estimates between $1 and $1.5 billion in organic 
foods were imported between 2002 and 2003 (Oberholtzer, Dimitri and Greene 2005).  
All imported organics must meet US organic standards.            
The advocacy group Organic Consumers’ Association is concerned that Wal-Mart 
does not care about the principles behind organic agriculture and that outsourcing will 
lead to violation of organic standards and labor conditions contrary to what an organic 
consumer would consider equitable (Scheuer 2006).  The goal of organic food production 
is healthier food and more environmentally sustainable practices.  Some argue that this 
goal is undoubtedly linked to small, locally owned farms.  Organic practices have 
evolved in small farming and some may prefer a local approach.  However, organic 
agriculture is a type of farming practice and does not prohibit industrialized farming.  
According to one organic activist, there are important issues about protecting standards 
but the implementation of uniform standards opens the door to industrialization (Scheuer 
2006).  Industrialization allows more people to have access to organic foods, which may 
outweigh the value of the local-organic connection.        
Maintaining the integrity of organic products is a pertinent issue as organics move 
further into the mainstream market.  This thesis considers this issue in its discussion 
throughout; however, organic integrity will not be considered in the econometric 
analysis.       
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Summary 
 
 The impacts on organic agriculture, supply chain operations, the retail sector, 
consumer welfare and organic integrity are significant to the discussion of the organic 
mainstream movement and to the understanding of its potential ramifications.  This thesis 
will focus specifically on these impacts in the retail market including on the 
competitiveness of the retail market and the expected Wal-Mart effect.  The primary 
objective will be to analyze the impact of market structure on performance in the retail 
organic market.  Performance will be examined through analysis of retail price in relation 
to product, store, community and market conditions.  Moreover, a summary of the effect 
of non-traditional grocers will be used to infer the positive and negative effects of non-
traditional grocers on both consumers and competing traditional grocers. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 THE DATA 
Primary Price Data 
This section describes the price data collected for the empirical analysis of this 
thesis.  Problems encountered in the data collection process are also detailed.  Descriptive 
statistics of the raw price data are included. 
 It was necessary to collect primary data as Wal-Mart does not participate in any 
syndicated data services.  Data on pricing and merchandising were collected over 10 days 
in early 2007 for fourteen organic produce items.  The top eleven products were surveyed 
including grape tomatoes, large red tomatoes, baby carrots, butternut squash, romaine 
lettuce, baby spinach, red delicious apples, golden delicious apples, gala apples, brown 
russet potatoes and bananas.  These produce items were selected for being the most 
frequently purchased organic produce items in the U.S. according to a 2005 report 
provided by the Economic Research Service of the USDA. The remaining three produce 
items are strawberries, green bell peppers and celery.  These were selected on the basis of 
pesticide use. The intuition behind this selection is that consumer demand would be 
higher for organic produce due to concern about high levels of pesticide use.  Price data 
were collected for all fourteen products across all brands available at each retail location.   
The price data were collected directly from the shelves of 37 food retail stores 
including Wal-Mart Supercenters, Super Stop & Shops, Whole Foods, Trader Joe’s, and 
Wild Oats stores in Connecticut, Massachusetts, New Hampshire and Rhode Island.  The 
stores were selected from a sample of 17 New England micro-markets across varying 
market structures.  These micro-markets were formed from New England metropolitan 
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statistical areas as defined by the US Census.  The sampling frame of these markets is 
displayed in Table 3. 
 Micro-markets to be sampled were chosen to capture four naturally occurring 
market structures.  Table 3 shows the four market structures: 1) markets with all store 
types present (traditional, non-traditional and natural/specialty), 2) markets with non-
traditional (Wal-Mart) and traditional (Super Stop & Shop) stores present, 3) markets 
with conventional (Super Stop & Shop) and specialty (e.g., Whole Foods) stores present, 
and 4) markets with only traditional (Super Stop & Shop) stores present.  These four 
market structures are shown in Table 3 below.   
Table 3: Example of Proposed Markets to Examine 
Food Store Type Market 1 Market 2 Market 3 Market 4 
Traditional a  X X X X 
Non-Traditional b  X X   
Natural/Specialty 
Food Store 
X  X  
a Refers to supermarkets and superstores 
b Refers to Wal-Mart Supercenters, wholesale clubs and warehouse stores 
 
Table 4 shows the 17 New England micro markets studied and the stores where 
data was collected in each.  Only the metropolitan statistical areas in the four New 
England states studied containing the above stated food retailers were considered.  Based 
on the geographic location of the food retailers within the metropolitan statistical areas, 
micro-markets were formed.  The geographic location of each food retailer was 
determined using the ReferenceUSA database. 
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      Table 4. Retail Store Sampling Frame 
 Market 
Structures 
Structure 
Description 
Statistical 
Metropolitan 
Area 
Micro Market Store Breakdown  
1 
Non-Traditional, 
Traditional and 
Specialty Springfield, MA Ware, MA 
1 Wal-Mart                              
1 Whole Foods                       
1 Trader Joe's                          
2 Super Stop & Shops 
Haverhill-North 
Andover, MA-
NH Epping, NH 
1 Wal-Mart                              
1 Super Stop & Shops 
Lawrence-
Methuen,  
MA-NH Methuen, MA 
1 Wal-Mart                              
1 Super Stop & Shops 
Taunton, MA Raynham, MA 
1 Wal-Mart                              
1 Super Stop & Shops 
2 
Non-Traditional and 
Traditional 
 
 
Norwich-New 
London, CT-RI Westerly, RI 
1 Wal-Mart                              
1 Super Stop & Shops 
Framingham, 
MA 
Frammingham, 
MA 
1 Whole Foods                        
1 Trader Joe's                         
1 Super Stop & Shops 
Hartford-West 
Hartford, RI 
West Hartford, 
CT 
1 Whole Foods                        
1 Trader Joe's                          
1 Wild Oats                              
1 Super Stop & Shops 
Lynn-Peabody, 
MA 
Swampscott, 
MA 
1 Whole Foods                        
1 Trader Joe's                         
1 Super Stop & Shops 
Worcester, MA Worcester, MA 
1 Trader Joe's                         
1 Super Stop & Shops 
Bridgeport, CT Greenwich, CT 
1 Whole Foods                       
1 Trader Joe's                          
1 Super Stop & Shops 
Boston, MA Hingham, MA 
1 Whole Foods                     
1 Super Stop & Shops 
 
3 
Traditional and 
Specialty 
   
Providence,  
RI-MA Providence, RI 
1 Whole Foods                       
1 Super Stop & Shops 
Manchester, NH Manchester, NH 1 Super Stop & Shops 
New Bedford, 
MA 
New Bedford, 
MA 1 Super Stop & Shops 
New Haven, CT 
Old Saybrook, 
CT 1 Super Stop & Shops 
Pittsfield, MA Pittsfield, MA 1 Super Stop & Shops 
4 Traditional 
Waterbury, CT Waterbury, CT 1 Super Stop & Shops 
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Each geographic micro market was formed within a 15 mile diameter.  According 
to Cotterill (1986), a geographically competitive market has been defined as being five 
miles in diameter, as consumers are known to typically shop within five miles of their 
residence.  However, critics speculate and I hypothesize that organic shoppers are willing 
to travel outside of the typical five mile diameter for a specialty product.   
 
Issues with Data Collection 
 Two of the micro-markets, both in Connecticut, from the original sample 
containing Wal-Mart Supercenters did not carry produce.  Therefore, two additional 
micro-markets containing Wal-Mart Supercenters were sampled to ensure each of the 
market structures were equally sampled.  (Table 4 shows the actual markets sampled.)     
 The availability of individual commodities was not consistent across all store 
formats.  Some food retailers carried multiple products for various produce items.  In 
contrast, other stores had limited or no availability of some produce items.  Therefore, it 
is important to note the number of observations per produce item does not equal the 
number of stores.  This is true among the three types of food retailers considered.  Wal-
Mart Supercenters is the only food retailer to not carry certain produce items across all 
locations sampled.  Wal-Mart Supercenters did not carry strawberries, green bell peppers, 
and butternut squash.  There was also limited availability of large red tomatoes, baby 
carrots and bananas across the Wal-Mart Supercenters sampled.  Butternut squash was 
the only product that was not widely available across all stores sampled.  Therefore, it 
was dropped from regression analysis for lack of observations, which would result in a 
problem of degrees of freedom.  Thus thirteen produce items are analyzed in the 
regression analysis.  
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 Brands were also inconsistent across store formats.  This is due in part to branding 
being a relatively new phenomenon within the organic produce market.  Stop and Shop 
has developed its own store brand, Nature’s Promise, for its organic produce and carries 
that brand predominately.  Wal-Mart Supercenters carried only branded and prepackaged 
produce, which included more name brand items, like Earthbound Farms and Newman’s 
Own.  The Specialty stores carried a slew of brands, from farm branded to name brand 
produce items.  Brand information was collected for each produce item sampled.  As 
suspected, the null hypothesis of homogeneity among brands for each product was not 
rejected.  Therefore there is no private label versus branded produce dynamic in the 
following analysis. 
 Additionally, quality is not homogenous across the three store formats.  For 
instance, produce sold at Whole Foods stores specifically looked as if it had been 
polished to perfection.  This was not typically the case at Super Stop and Shops and Wal-
Mart Supercenters.  Moreover, bruising and imperfections were not recorded.  Therefore, 
it is important to note that quality is not controlled for.       
 Price per weight for all products was not consistent from store to store.  This is 
due to differences in merchandising.  For example, organic potatoes were sold 
individually or in bulk or both at some stores.  Wal-Mart Supercenters tended to carry its 
produce in bulk, whereas Super Stop and Shops and Specialty stores tended to sell 
organic produce individually and in bulk.  This phenomenon is true for all produce items 
sampled, except strawberries and baby carrots, which were consistently packaged across 
all stores.  To resolve this issue, price information was collected for all organic products 
sold individually and in bulk from each location sampled.  Furthermore, all prices were 
transformed to a dollar per pound measure for consistency.    
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 5 reports the average price per product across each store format.  
Observations from Whole Foods, Wild Oats and Trader Joe’s are aggregated in a 
Specialty store category.  Given previous research, it is hypothesized that Wal-Mart 
Supercenters would generally have lower prices than Super Stop and Shop and Specialty 
stores.  Expectations about price differences between Super Stop and Shop and Specialty 
stores are uncertain, but I would expect Super Stop and Shop stores to have lower prices.  
Table 5 reveals that overall Wal-Mart Supercenters have lower prices than 
Specialty and Super Stop and Shop stores for organic produce using one tailed t-tests.  
For all products, except for tomatoes, baby carrots, romaine lettuce, baby spinach and 
gala apples, the prices at Wal-Mart Supercenters are less statistically significant than 
those of Specialty stores.  The products with the greatest statistical average price 
differences between Wal-Mart Supercenters and Specialty stores are celery ($0.55/lb.) 
and red and golden delicious apples ($0.50/lb.).  Additionally, several other products such 
as bananas and potatoes exhibit more than a $0.40 average price difference per pound 
between the two store formats.   
Wal-Mart Supercenter prices are also statistically significantly lower than those of 
Super Stop and Shop for all products except for grape tomatoes, baby carrots, romaine 
lettuce, and celery.  The products with the greatest statistically significant average price 
difference between Wal-Mart Supercenters and Super Stop and Shops are large red 
tomatoes ($1.20/lb.) and baby spinach ($1.25/lb.).   
The only products for which Wal-Mart Supercenters have higher prices than the 
other store formats is for grape tomatoes and baby carrots.  Neither of these results is 
statistically significant.  However, this result could be due to the fact that Wal-Mart 
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Supercenters carry baby carrots that are double packaged, individual snack size packages 
are contained within one big package.   
                    Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for Retail Price per Pound by Product and Store Type 
  
Large 
Tomatoes 
Grape 
Tomatoes
Baby 
Carrots
Butternut 
Squash 
Romaine 
Lettuce 
Baby 
Spinach Potatoes 
Mean               
(1) Wal-Mart  
     Supercenters  2.97 3.40 3.92 NA 5.55 8.34 0.52 
(2) Specialty  3.56 3.16 1.86 1.56 7.36 8.19 0.93 
(3) Super Stop  
     And Shop  4.17 3.28 2.10 1.49 6.67 9.59 0.84 
Standard Deviation          
(1) NA 0.62 3.16 NA 6.11 0.43 0.11 
(2) 1.32 0.88 0.30 0.20 4.44 1.75 0.41 
(3)  0.40 0.55 0.39 0.00 3.12 0.79 0.09 
CV          
(1) NA 18.24 80.61 NA 110.09 5.16 21.24 
(2) 37.08 27.85 16.13 12.82 60.33 21.37 44.09 
(3)  9.59 16.77 18.57 0.00 46.78 8.24 10.71 
Price Difference  
(Pair wise t-tests)          
(1) & (2) one tail 0.59 -0.24 -2.06 NA 1.81 -0.15 0.41*** 
(1) & (3) one tail  1.20*** -0.12 -1.82 NA 1.12 1.25*** 0.32*** 
(2) & (3) two tail 0.61*** 0.12*** 0.24*** 0.07 0.69** 1.4*** 0.09** 
  
Golden 
Delicious 
Red 
Delicious Gala Bananas 
Straw-
berries 
Green 
Bell 
Peppers Celery 
Mean               
(1) Wal-Mart  
     Supercenters  1.66 1.66 1.50 0.69 NA NA 2.60 
(2) Specialty  2.16 2.16 1.77 1.14 8.60 5.11 3.15 
(3) Super Stop  
     And Shop 1.84 1.83 1.84 0.97 7.65 7.98 2.91 
Standard Deviation          
(1) 0.00 0.00 0.29 0.76 NA NA 0.22 
(2) 0.56 0.49 0.84 0.40 2.23 1.53 0.97 
(3) 0.26 0.28 0.26 0.05 0.76 0.00 0.47 
CV          
(1) 0.00 0.00 19.33 110.14 NA NA 8.47 
(2) 25.93 22.69 47.46 35.09 25.93 29.94 30.79 
(3)  14.13 15.30 14.13 5.15 9.94 0.00 16.15 
Price Difference  
(Pair wise t-tests)          
(1) & (2) one tail 0.50*** 0.50*** 0.27 0.45*** NA NA 0.55** 
(1) & (3) one tail 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.34** 0.28*** NA NA 0.31 
(2) & (3) two tail 0.32** 0.33** 0.07 0.17 0.95 2.87*** 0.24 
  ***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level  
*: Significant at the .10 level 
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 Table 5 also displays the coefficient of variation of price per product across the 
three store formats.  The coefficient of variation measures relative variability and is 
calculated by dividing the sample standard deviation by the sample mean.   Wal-Mart 
Supercenters demonstrate low relative variability, except for baby carrots, romaine 
lettuce, and bananas.  This implies that Wal-Mart prices its goods relatively consistently 
across store locations.  Super Stop and Shop prices also show low relative variability, 
except for romaine lettuce.  In contrast, Specialty store prices exhibit high relative 
variability.  This is expected as this category (Specialty) encompasses three different 
chains whereas the others are homogeneous. 
 Tables 6a – 6b, respectively, report the average price of Super Stop and Shops and 
Specialty stores in the presence of a Wal-Mart Supercenter.  As shown in Table 6a, 
tomato prices at Super Stop and Shop are statistically lower in markets where a Wal-Mart 
Supercenter is present.  There are no other statistical differences in price for the other 
Super Stop and Shop produce products. 
  Table 6a.  Super Stop and Shop’s Average Price across Markets with and without a  
                                           Wal-Mart Supercenter Present    
  Supercenter No Supercenter Price Difference 
Tomatoes 3.99 4.62 0.63** 
Grape Tomatoes 3.23 3.27 0.04 
Baby Carrots 1.99 2.20 0.21 
Butternut Squash 1.49 1.49   
Romaine Lettuce 6.94 6.52 0.42 
Baby Spinach 9.71 9.51 0.20 
Golden Delicious 1.82 1.86 0.04 
Red Delicious 1.79 1.86 0.07 
Gala 1.82 1.86 0.04 
Potatoes 0.86 0.82 0.04 
Bananas 0.97 0.97   
Strawberries 7.69 7.62 0.07 
Bell Peppers 7.98 7.98   
Celery 2.79 2.99 0.20 
  ***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                                   
 *: Significant at the .10 level 
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 Table 6b shows a statistically significant reduction in price for tomatoes, romaine 
lettuce, and potatoes at Specialty stores in the presence of a Wal-Mart Supercenter.  
Tomatoes sold at Specialty stores in markets with a Wal-Mart Supercenter present are 
priced 42 percent, approximately $1.50, less than those sold in a market where a 
supercenter is not present.  This phenomenon is similar for romaine lettuce and brown 
russet potatoes, which are priced 40 percent and 21 percent lower respectively at 
Specialty stores with a Wal-Mart Supercenter present within its micro market. 
  Table 6b. Specialty Store Average Price across Markets with and without a  
                                     Wal-Mart Supercenter Present  
  Supercenter No Supercenter Price Difference 
Tomatoes 2.15 3.69 1.54** 
Grape Tomatoes 3.35 3.12 0.23 
Baby Carrots 1.88 1.86 0.02 
Butternut Squash 1.49 1.57 0.08 
Romaine Lettuce 4.51 7.62 3.11** 
Baby Spinach 7.92 8.25 0.33 
Golden Delicious 2.49 2.14 0.35 
Red Delicious 2.49 2.13 0.36 
Gala 1.74 1.77 0.03 
Potatoes 0.75 0.96 0.21* 
Bananas 1.14 1.14   
Strawberries 11.96 8.12 3.84 
Bell Peppers 5.38 5.08 0.30 
Celery 2.84 3.19 0.35 
 ***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
 *: Significant at the .10 level 
 
Summary 
 Aligning with the hypothesis of this thesis, the descriptive statistics reveal there 
are statistically significant differences in prices across the three different store formats.  
Depending on the produce item there are some statistically significant differences across 
different market structures where a Wal-Mart Supercenter is present or not.  The 
following chapter estimates the drivers behind these differences in terms of product, 
store, community and market level attributes.     
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CHAPTER 4 
 THE MODEL 
 The empirical goal of the regression analysis of this thesis is to estimate price 
differences of 13 organic produce items across varying store formats and market 
structures.  The price differences will be interpreted in terms of product, store, 
community and market level attributes.  Another goal is to isolate the effect of the 
presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters on prices at traditional grocers, including 
conventional supermarkets and specialty stores.      
 The theoretical results and descriptive statistics from the previous chapters are 
used as the foundation for the model developed.  First, the model is presented followed 
by a discussion of the variables used in the analysis.  Then the summary statistics and 
hypothesized signs of the variables used in the estimation process are displayed.   The 
analysis examines retail price changes in organic produce across 17 different micro-
markets in New England.  The model estimates the impact of product, store, community 
and market attributes on the retail price of 13 organic produce items.  The model uses the 
form: eZXWVY iiii +++++= ββββα   where Y is the retail price of organic produce 
item i , V is a vector of product attribute variables, W is a vector of store level variables, 
X  is a vector of community level variables and Z is a vector of market level variables  
suggested by economic theory to explain organic produce prices.  
  
Variables Used in the Model 
 The empirical model for the price of an organic produce item i (i = type of 
product for each of the 13 products) in relation to product, store, community and market 
level attributes is expressed as follows (see table 7 for a summary of variables used): 
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Table 7. Summary Statistics for Independent Variables 
  N % of Sample 
Packaging     
     Tomatoes 28 25.0% 
     Grape Tomatoes 47 96.0% 
     Baby Carrots 43 100.0% 
     Romaine Lettuce 47 89.0% 
     Spinach 50 92.0% 
     Golden Delicious 48 52.0% 
     Red Delicious 47 51.0% 
     Gala 55 51.0% 
     Potatoes 42 93.0% 
     Bananas 34 59.0% 
     Strawberries 25 96.0% 
     Green Bell Peppers 25 84.0% 
     Celery 35 94.0% 
Wal-Mart 74 12.0% 
Stop and Shop 74 49.0% 
Specialty 74 39.0% 
Layout 74 38.0% 
Over One 74 85.0% 
Market 1 74 15.0% 
Market 2 74 24.0% 
Market 3 74 43.0% 
Market 4 74 12.0% 
Concentrate 74 55.0% 
Supercenter 74 21.0% 
  N Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
AA 74 3.51% 3.44% 0.40% 11.03%
Hispanic 74 6.15% 7.76% 0.75% 33.51%
Asian 74 2.57% 1.93% 0.54% 7.60%
Poverty 74 7.17% 4.62% 3.37% 22.42%
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  Table 8. Variables Used in Models (1) – (3) 
Variable Description Expected Sign
Product Level   
PACKAGE Dummy equal to 1 if the product is packaged. - 
Store Level   
WALMART 
Dummy equal to 1 if the product is from a Wal-
Mart Supercenter. - 
STOPSHOP 
Dummy equal to 1 if the product is from a Super 
Stop and Shop. - 
LAYOUT 
Dummy equal to 1 if the store has separate 
organic produce sections. +/- 
OVERONE 
Dummy equal to 1 if the store has more than 100 
employees. +/- 
Community 
Level   
AA 
The percentage of African Americans in the city 
or town of the sampled store location. - 
HISPANIC 
The percentage of Hispanics in the city or town of 
the sampled store location. - 
ASIAN 
The percentage of Asians in the city or town of 
the sampled store location. - 
POVERTY 
The percentage of the population below the 
poverty line in the city or town of the sampled 
store location. - 
Market Level   
MKT2 
Dummy equal to 1 if the store sampled is in this 
market type. - 
MKT3 
Dummy equal to 1 if the store sampled is in this 
market type. +/- 
MKT4 
Dummy equal to 1 if the store sampled is in this 
market type. +/- 
CONCENTRATE 
Dummy equal to 1 if the store sampled is in a 
market with less than three competitors. +/- 
SUPERCENTER 
Dummy equal to 1 if the store sampled is in a 
market with a Wal-Mart Supercenter present. - 
 
PACKAGE is a binary variable intended to capture the variations in price due to 
the product attribute of whether the produce item is packaged or not.  Previous research 
reveals that packaging has been shown to lower handling costs and in turn reduce the 
retail price of fresh produce (Simmons 1949; Williams et al. 1982; Calvin et al. 2001).  
Therefore, this variable is expected to be negative.  Typically, Wal-Mart Supercenters 
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carry only prepackaged organic produce and Super Stop and Shop stores carry 
predominately prepackaged organic produce.   
It is important to note that firms not only compete through price, but also along 
many other product and store dimensions such as service, quality, research and 
development and promotional activities (Perloff 2005).  In addition to collecting price 
data, store attribute mixes will be delineated and examined in an attempt to capture non-
price competition.  Some stores have a larger variety of organic products than others.  
The way a store has dedicated store space to their organic selection may be an important 
attribute in contributing to pricing patterns.  Some stores dedicate an entire department to 
organic products while others sell their organic products alongside conventional products 
throughout the entire store. This is measured through LAYOUT, a binary store attribute 
that indicates whether the store dedicates separate sections to organic produce items or 
integrates its organic produce with its conventional produce.  This variable takes on a 
value of 1 if the store sells organic produce items in separate sections.  A separate section 
is defined by at least a separate kiosk (presentation area).  A LAYOUT variable for a store 
takes a value of one only if at least fifty percent of the organic items sampled are on 
kiosks separate from conventional products.   
It maybe important to capture price variation due to store type, as the 
merchandising of organic produce differs between store formats.  WALMART and 
STOPSHOP are binary store attribute variables depicting the store type from which the 
organic produce item was sampled.  The reference category is the Specialty store type, 
the third and final store type sampled.   
OVERONE is a binary store attribute variable representing store size.  It takes on 
a value of 1 if the store from which the produce item was sampled has more than one 
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hundred employees.  These data were collected from a 2007 database service, 
ReferenceUSA.  Store size is important to consider as previous research has found that 
store size can impact prices in two different directions (Binkley and Connor 1996; 
MacDonald and Nelson 1991).  Larger stores typically provide more products and 
services, as well as more employees, contributing to higher prices.  However, larger 
stores can experience economies of scale resulting in lower prices to consumers.  
Therefore, the estimated effect of this variable may be positive or negative.  Moreover, 
Supercenters are expected to have the lowest prices as they are the largest stores sampled 
(Volpe and Lavoie 2007).   
The next set of variables are community characteristics that reflect demand 
factors.  Community demographics may also be important in explaining pricing 
differences.  Community demographics such as income should be considered because 
consumers may become less price sensitive as income increases (Hoch, Kim, 
Montgomery, and Rossi, 1995).  Moreover, consumers with annual incomes greater than 
$60,000 are more likely to choose conventional supermarkets over discount stores such 
as Wal-Mart (Palma, Emerson, and House, 2003).  Unlike other price-concentration 
studies, Newmark (1990) included household income in his econometric analysis, which 
proved to be significant and positively related to prices.  He concluded that household 
income actually accounted for 60 percent of the variation in prices for his data.  The 
income data collected for this study had relatively low variability and therefore held no 
significance in explaining changes in the retail price of organic produce across different 
submarkets.  In this study, the variable POVERTY was used, which depicts the percentage 
of the population below the poverty line in the submarket where the store is located.  The 
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estimated effect of the variable POVERTY is expected to be negative.  These data were 
collected from the 2005 American Community Survey of the US Census.   
Hoch, Kim, Montgomery, and Rossi (1995) determined that certain minority 
groups, specifically African Americans and Hispanics, are more sensitive to grocery 
prices.  Three variables are included, AA, HISPANIC, and ASIAN, measuring the 
percentage level of specific ethnic populations in the submarket of the store location 
sampled.  The estimated effects on organic prices are expected to be negative.     
Finally, to examine the relationship between price and market structure, market 
level attributes are considered.  MKT2, MKT3, and MKT4 (see table 3) are binary 
variables depicting the type of market structure for the store location.  MKT1 is used as 
the reference category.  Equation (1) is estimated for each product of the 13 products 
sampled to prevent a loss of statistical importance for factors due to the aggregation of 
products.     
 Two alternative specifications of the market level attribute are also estimated.  
Equation (2) below substitutes a CONCENTRATE variable for MKT2, MKT3 and MKT4  
to measure market structure impacts on price.  CONCENTRATE is a binary variable, 
which takes on a value of 1 for stores in markets with fewer than three competitors.  This 
variable captures the number of competitors within the market sampled, including all 
other food retailers such as Shaws, Big Y, Hannaford, Price Chopper and Market Basket.  
This model attempts to measure the impact of the shear number of competitors versus the 
type of competitors present in a market. 
(2)     
uECONCENTRAT
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 The second alternative specification (Equation (3)) attempts to estimate the 
impact of the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters on organic produce prices in Equation 
(3) below.  This equation uses the market attribute variable SUPERCENTER, which is a 
binary variable taking on the value of 1 for stores in markets with a Wal-Mart 
Supercenter present.  This model is estimated for Super Stop and Shop and Specialty 
store prices separately.  Therefore, the indicator variables for store type are not included 
in this model. 
   (3)     
uRSUPERCENTEASIANHISPANIC
AAPOVERTYOVERONELAYOUTPACKAGEPi
++++
++++++=
11109
876320
βββ
ββββββ
 
 The dependent variables used in the estimations of equation (1) – (3) are the raw 
price data transformed to a consistent price per pound measure for each of the 13 organic 
produce items sampled.  Price indexes used in previous research are not necessary here 
because there is no aggregation of prices across commodities and produce is the only 
store department considered.       
 
Summary Statistics of Independent Variables 
 Table 7 displays the descriptive statistics for the independent variables included in 
the model.  Regarding product attributes, packaging is not included in the model 
estimated for baby carrots because 100 percent of the organic baby carrots sampled were 
prepackaged.  The store level variables are biased as a result.  Similarly, the majority, 
more than 80 percent of grape tomatoes, romaine lettuce, spinach, brown russet potatoes, 
strawberries, green bell peppers and celery were also prepackaged.   
 The store level variables are broken down as follows, only 12 percent of the 
products sampled came from Wal-Mart Supercenters. 49 percent came from Super Stop 
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and Shops and 39 percent were sampled from Specialty grocers (including Whole Foods, 
Wild Oats and Trader Joe’s).  Nearly 40 percent of the products came from stores 
dedicating separate sections to organic produce.  An overwhelming 85 percent of the 
products were sampled from stores with more than one hundred employees.   
 Considering the market level variables, 15 percent of the products were sampled 
from stores in market structure 1 (all three types of grocers), 24 percent were sampled 
from stores in market 2 (Super Stop and Shops and Wal-Mart Supercenters), 43 percent 
came from stores in market 3 (Super Stop and Shops and Specialty grocers) and 12 
percent were from stores in market structure 4 (only Super Stop and Shops).  55 percent 
of the organic products were sampled from stores in markets with less than three 
competitors present.  Only 21 percent of the products were sampled from stores with a 
Wal-Mart Supercenter present.   
 The typical market sampled had a population comprised of 3.5 percent African 
Americans, 6.2 percent Hispanics, 2.5 percent Asians and 7.2 percent of individuals who 
were below poverty.  The percent of Hispanics has the highest variability across markets.  
The number of African Americans and the amount of individuals below poverty varied 
moderately across the respective markets.  However, there is relatively low variability in 
the percent of Asians across markets sampled.    
 Table 8 shows the hypothesized expected signs of the independent variables 
included in all three models.  The individual variables are displayed across the four levels 
of attributes: product, store, community and market conditions. 
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CHAPTER 5 
  RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 This chapter presents the estimation results for the three empirical models 
discussed in the previous chapter.  The tests performed to determine whether statistically 
significant price differences occur due to store type and market conditions are also 
detailed in this chapter. 
 Equations (1) – (3) were estimated for each of the 13 organic produce products 
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression techniques.  For ease of interpretation, 
Tables 9-12, present the regression results using a log-log transformation.  The linear 
OLS regression results are reported in the appendix.  In all the tables, the three equations 
discussed in the previous chapter are depicted by models 1, 2 and 3.  Subsequent tests 
were performed to determine if collinearity or heteroscedasticity presented a problem in 
the data.     
 As shown in tables 9 and 10, the explanatory power for Models 1 and 2 are 
statistically significant at the one percent level for all products except grape tomatoes, 
which is significant at the five percent level, and baby carrots, which is insignificant.   
 Model 3, which attempts to capture the impact of the presence of Wal-Mart 
Supercenters on Super Stop and Shop and Specialty store prices separately, did not 
perform as well.  Table 11, reporting the results of Model 3 applied to Super Stop and 
Shop stores only, shows the explanatory power to be statistically significant at the one 
percent level for red delicious, golden delicious and gala apples.  Table 12, which shows 
the results of Model 3 applied to Specialty stores shows the explanatory power to be 
statistically significant at the one percent level for gala apples and potatoes, at the five 
percent level for red delicious apples and celery, and at the ten percent level for romaine 
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lettuce.  The 2R  values range between 22-90% for Model 1, 24-88% for Model 2 and 30-
87% for Model 3 for the products for which the model explained statistically significant 
amounts of the price variation.                
 Two measures were utilized to search for collinearity among the explanatory 
variables in the models.  The first are variance inflation factors (VIFs); a VIF above 10 
suggests the presence of problematic collinearity among the explanatory variables.  All of 
the VIFs were below ten for all models, suggesting collinearity is not a problem.  
Condition indices were also used to search for problems of collinearity between the 
explanatory variables in the model.  Condition indices are formed using eigenvalues, 
which measure the variance of linear combinations among the explanatory variables.  
Condition indices above the benchmark of 25 suggest a presence of collinearity among 
the explanatory variables.  All of the condition indices were below the benchmark and 
suggest there is no problem of collinearity among the explanatory variables. 
 White’s test for heteroscedastic variances were performed for all estimated 
models.  The null hypotheses of homoscedasticity were not rejected for all models. 
 The coefficients for the binary variables in the log transformed model do not 
depict the percent change in the dependent variable.  Therefore, the coefficients were 
corrected to measure the percentage price change using, 100*1exp
))ˆvar(
2
1ˆ(* ⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −= − ββg , 
where βˆ  is the OLS estimate, )ˆvar(β is the variance of βˆ  from OLS, and *g is the 
correct estimate for the percent change in the dependent variable (Kennedy 2003).  The 
interpretations for the following tables, 9-12, utilize this transformation.  The transformed 
percents discussed are based on statistically significant coefficients.   
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Table 9. Log Regression Results for Model 1 
  
Large 
Red 
Tomatoes 
Grape 
Tomatoes 
Baby 
Carrots 
Romaine 
Lettuce 
Baby 
Spinach 
Red 
Delicious 
Golden 
Delicious 
Intercept 196.2*** 69.8*** 70.9*** 160.5*** 190.7*** 44.3*** 59.0*** 
  29.9 20.3 33.8 26.8 14.8 8.6 8.0 
PACKAGE -50.4*** 8.2  -55.0*** 9.5 -20.2*** -20.7*** 
  16.9 13.9  12.7 7.7 2.7 2.6 
LAYOUT 3.4 12.0** 9.7 13.8 -1.2 -1.3 1.3 
  10.5 6.2 12.7 8.4 4.4 2.9 2.7 
WALMART -46.6 3.5 53.6*** -45.9*** -5.4 -14.9** -17.9 
  29.3 12.5 22.5 16.7 8.6 6.2 6.1 
STOPSHOP -1.8 0.8 15.4 1.9 10.9** -18.8*** -19.2*** 
  15.5 7.3 15.1 10.5 6.0 3.7 3.4 
OVERONE   28.1*** 8.6 38.0*** 13.0* 56.6*** 44.3*** 
    9.1 17.8 13.2 6.9 6.8 5.8 
AA 5.2 4.2 1.1 0.4 -3.5 2.1 3.0 
  9.5 5.3 11.1 8.0 3.3 2.3 2.2 
HISPANIC 17.0 -5.6 7.6 -2.7 -0.9 0.02 0.02 
  11.2 5.6 12.8 8.9 3.8 2.6 2.4 
ASIAN -10.8 3.4 -1.7 4.4 -3.6 2.3 -0.6 
  7.9 4.8 10.5 6.8 3.4 2.2 2.1 
POVERTY -37.5*** 4.9 -14.2 10.7 2.8 -4.7 -5.4 
  15.2 8.9 19.7 15.0 6.5 4.2 3.9 
MKT2 4.6 5.3 -12.0 3.7 -0.05 -6.6* -4.3 
  17.9 10.2 20.3 13.3 6.2 3.8 3.5 
MKT3 1.7 -0.2 -8.8 1.3 6.8 -7.0* -6.1** 
  12.0 7.0 13.8 10.1 4.7 3.5 3.2 
MKT4 0.5 -7.2 5.1 4.4 -1.5 -2.8 -4.5 
  17.0 11.6 23.6 16.9 7.9 5.3 4.9 
N 27 46 42 46 49 46 47 
F 3.55*** 3.08** 1.270 5.83*** 3.20*** 18.49*** 25.68*** 
2R  0.709 0.423 0.310 0.672 0.509 0.867 0.898 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
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Table 9. Log Regression Results for Model 1 continued 
  Gala Potatoes Bananas Strawberries 
Green Bell 
Peppers Celery 
Intercept 10.4 2.5 43.1 199.7*** 135.1*** 50.2** 
  14.3 11.8 20.2 24.4 27.2 23.2 
PACKAGE -16.3*** -56.6 -34.1*** 0.7 38.1** 12.9 
  5.1 6.5*** 12.5 17.6 18.8 12.7 
LAYOUT 7.2 6.3* 5.1 -10.9 4.7 7.9 
  5.6 3.7 7.6 6.5 11.9 6.5 
WALMART -34.7*** -65.8*** 29.0 -49.9   -34.1*** 
  11.6 7.4 18.0 13.9   12.7 
STOPSHOP -19.0*** -13.6*** 46.0*** 55.9*** 38.5*** -24.9*** 
  7.7 4.9 13.3 15.5 13.6 9.0 
OVERONE 93.1*** 37.7*** -57.2*** 2.1   53.1*** 
  9.0 4.9 11.1 4.9   9.3 
AA 2.3 6.1** 1.9 -5.1 -7.8 10.4** 
  4.3 3.1 6.5 5.3 8.5 5.1 
HISPANIC 1.8 -8.8*** 3.9 -0.3 4.9 -6.7 
  5.0 3.4 7.9 4.0 11.3 5.8 
ASIAN 0.8 -2.4 -3.2 -0.3 -1.5 -0.9 
  4.3 2.7 6.4 4.0 9.0 5.8 
POVERTY -7.3 6.5 -5.7 3.5 -4.7 3.4 
  8.1 6.1 11.6 9.0 19.3 9.3 
MKT2 -7.2 15.2*** 8.6 -6.4 -2.2 12.2 
  7.8 5.4 12.5 7.9 17.2 10.3 
MKT3 -11.6* 8.1** 2.8 -1.3 7.6 6.0 
  6.4 4.1 8.3 6.8 11.7 7.3 
MKT4 -9.6 -5.4 -1.4 -3.0 7.2 4.2 
  10.4 7.2 13.6 9.0 17.4 11.3 
N 54 41 33 24 24 34 
F 15.54*** 34.36*** 3.48*** 3.39** 4.41*** 5.37*** 
2R  0.816 0.934 0.665 0.741 0.759 0.746 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
 
 Table 9 shows the results for Model 1.  The coefficients of the PACKAGE 
variable all have the expected negative sign, except for strawberries, celery, grape 
tomatoes and baby spinach.  None of the exceptional cases are statistically significant.  
PACKAGE was not included in the baby carrots model because all of the baby carrots 
sampled were prepackaged.  This result implies that if organic produce items are 
prepackaged there are negative impacts on its retail price.  The largest impacts are seen 
on the price of romaine lettuce, large red tomatoes, potatoes and green bell peppers.  
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There is a 55 percent decrease in the retail price of prepackaged romaine lettuce.  
Prepackaged large red tomatoes see a decrease of 50 percent in retail price.  Both 
potatoes and green bell peppers experience a 43 percent decrease in retail price.  This is 
expected as packaged products are suggested to decrease shipping and handling costs. 
 The store level variable depicting the type of space dedicated to organics, 
(LAYOUT ), has coefficients with conflicting results across products.  They were positive 
and significant for grape tomatoes and potatoes only.  The estimated coefficients were 
conflicting in sign but insignificant across all other products.  There were no expected 
signs for this variable.  These results suggest a separate layout dedicated to organic 
produce may have a positive impact on some retail prices.  There is a 12 percent increase 
in retail price for grape tomatoes sold at stores that designate separate sections to organic 
produce.  Potatoes sold at stores with separate sections dedicated to organic produce 
experience a 6 percent increase in retail price.                   
 The remaining estimated coefficients for store level variables had consistent 
results.  The coefficients for WALMART are negative across all products, except for baby 
carrots, grape tomatoes and bananas.  These coefficients were all statistically significant, 
except for large red tomatoes, grape tomatoes, bananas, baby spinach, golden delicious 
apples and strawberries.  This suggests that the price of organic produce is lower at Wal-
Mart Supercenters than at Specialty stores.  There is a 48 percent lower retail price of 
potatoes and a 37 percent lower retail price of romaine lettuce sold at Wal-Mart 
Supercenters than those sold at Specialty stores.  Gala apples, large red tomatoes and 
celery sold at Wal-Mart Supercenters have a 29 percent lower retail price than those sold 
at Specialty stores.  Baby carrots are the only product to have higher prices (66 percent 
higher) sold at Wal-Mart Supercenters than at Specialty stores.  This result could be due 
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to the fact that baby carrots were double packaged only at Wal-Mart Supercenters; there 
were individual serving packages within one big package.  WALMART was not included 
in the models for green bell peppers because these produce items were not available at 
any of the Wal-Mart Supercenters sampled.                  
The coefficients for STOPSHOP are negative and significant for some organic 
produce items and positive and significant for others.  The retail price is lower at Super 
Stop and Shops than Specialty stores for celery (22 percent), red delicious (17 percent), 
golden delicious (17 percent), and gala apples (17 percent), and potatoes (12 percent).  
The coefficient is positive and significant for strawberries (57 percent), bananas (57 
percent), green bell peppers (45 percent) and baby spinach (11 percent).   
The stores with over one hundred employees (OVERONE) consistently have 
higher prices across almost all products; these price differences are typically statistically 
significant.  This result implies that larger stores have higher prices for gala apples (150 
percent), golden delicious apples (75 percent), celery (69 percent), red delicious apples 
(55), romaine lettuce (45 percent), potatoes (45 percent) and grape tomatoes (31 percent).  
The significant exception to this result is bananas.  There is a 43 percent decrease in the 
retail price of bananas at larger stores.  OVERONE was not included in the model for 
large red tomatoes and green bell peppers as all of those sampled were from stores with 
more than one hundred employees.  There was no expected sign for this coefficient as 
previous research found conflicting results for the impact of store size.  The coefficient 
could be positive as larger stores incur an increase in costs, specifically labor costs; 
however, the negative result could be due to a gain in efficiencies.          
 The coefficients for the community level variables were inconsistent and 
generally insignificant across all products.   The percent of the population that is African 
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American (AA) is positive and significant for potatoes at the one percent level, meaning 
there is a six percent increase in the retail price of potatoes as the number of African 
Americans increases by one percent.  The coefficient for the percent of the population 
that is Hispanic (HISPANIC) is positive and significant for large red tomatoes and 
negative and significant for potatoes.  Therefore, as the number of Hispanics increases by 
one percent the retail price of large red tomatoes increases by 18 percent and the retail 
price of potatoes decreases by eight percent.  The coefficient for the percent of population 
that is Asian (ASIAN) is negative and significant for baby spinach, meaning that as the 
number of Asians increases by one percent, the retail price of baby spinach decreases by 
13 percent.   The coefficient for POVERTY is negative and significant for large red 
tomatoes and golden delicious apples.  Therefore, a one percent increase in the number of 
individuals below the poverty line results in a retail price decrease of 33 percent for large 
red tomatoes and 4 percent for golden delicious apples. 
 The market structure dummies are also inconsistent and generally insignificant 
across all products.  The coefficients for MKT2 are negative and significant for red 
delicious apples, while the MKT3 coefficient is negative and significant for red delicious 
apples, golden delicious apples and gala apples.  This means that the retail prices of red 
delicious, golden delicious and gala apples sold in stores within the market structure of 
conventional and non-traditional grocers (MKT2) or conventional and specialty grocers 
(MKT3) are lower than those within market structures of non-traditional, conventional 
and specialty grocers (MKT1).  This implies that a reduction in the amount of competition 
and a change in the type of competition results in a reduction in some organic produce 
retail price. The only exception is for potatoes.  The coefficients for MKT2 and MKT3 are 
positive and significant for potatoes.  Therefore, the retail prices of potatoes sold from 
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stores within MKT2 and MKT3 are higher than those sold from stores in MKT1.  The 
coefficients for MKT4 are all inconsistent and insignificant.  
Table 10. Log Regression Results for Model 2 
  
Large 
Red 
Tomatoes 
Grape 
Tomatoes
Baby 
Carrots 
Romaine
Lettuce 
Baby 
Spinach 
Red 
Delicious 
Apples 
Golden 
Delicious 
Apples 
Intercept 198.4*** 70.0*** 0.714** 159.0*** 189.6*** 37.0*** 53.2*** 
  24.9 19.5 0.322 24.3 13.7 8.3 7.3 
PACKAGE -40.8*** 10.5   -42.8*** 8.7 -17.4*** -18.3*** 
  14.9 13.0   12.3 7.4 2.7 2.5 
LAYOUT 2.8 11.1** 0.070 14.3** -0.4 -2.4 -0.1 
  9.6 5.7 0.122 7.7 4.1 2.7 2.5 
WALMART -38.1* 4.7 0.651*** -36.5*** -9.3 -15.1*** -16.5*** 
  25.4 10.6 0.183 14.2 7.3 6.0 6.0 
STOPSHOP -3.2 -1.1 0.167 2.2 8.3 -17.1*** -17.4*** 
  12.8 6.7 0.139 9.7*** 5.5 3.7 3.3 
OVERONE  34.3*** 0.043 45.3 15.7** 79.4*** 59.7*** 
   8.8 0.171 12.8 6.6 6.9 5.7 
AA 4.9 1.5 0.074 0.7 -6.3** 2.2 2.3 
  8.7 5.1 0.105 6.8 3.4 2.2 2.0 
HISPANIC 16.6 -3.5 0.025 -3.3 2.0 0.4 1.1 
  9.9 5.3 0.117 7.8 3.8 2.6 2.4 
ASIAN -10.1 4.9 -0.131 4.7 -3.2* 0.9 -1.1 
  9.1 5.9 0.128 8.5 4.2 2.8 2.6 
POVERTY -37.9*** 1.3 -0.057 11.4 -1.0 -4.1 -6.4 
  13.2 8.0 0.179 12.4 6.0 4.3 3.9 
CONCENTRATE 0.4 2.8 -0.175 0.5 10.7 -0.7 0.8 
  12.6 8.1 0.169 11.5 5.5 4.3 3.8 
N 28 47 44 48 50 47 48 
F 4.85*** 2.53** 1.690 7.37*** 4.17*** 19.83*** 28.92*** 
2R  0.562 0.249 0.129 0.580 0.392 0.803 0.855 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
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Table 10. Log Regression Results for Model 2 continued 
  
Gala 
Apples Potatoes Bananas Strawberries
Green 
Bell 
Peppers 
Celery 
Intercept 4.8*** 17.9*** 47.8*** 197.0*** 129.0*** 56.4*** 
  13.8 12.0 19.0 21.8 22.8 20.9 
PACKAGE -14.0*** -42.9*** -28.8*** -2.0 -38.7** 10.2** 
  5.0 7.2 12.0 16.4 17.3 12.1 
LAYOUT 5.5 4.0 4.3 11.1*** 4.9 7.5 
  5.4 4.0 7.1 5.9 11.1 6.0 
WALMART -30.2*** -46.4*** 38.7***    -27.0*** 
  10.8 7.6 15.4    10.1 
STOPSHOP -17.6*** -13.4*** 56.2*** -41.3*** 47.3*** -22.1*** 
  7.6 5.0 12.7 12.5 12.4 7.6 
OVERONE 151.6*** 49.4*** -43.4*** 76.6***  74.0*** 
  9.1 5.4 10.7 14.4  8.8 
AA 0.6 2.0 0.4 1.7 -8.4 7.0 
  4.4 3.5 6.4 4.8 7.8 5.2 
HISPANIC 4.6 -5.3 4.6 -4.5 3.8 -4.6 
  5.0 3.8 7.8 4.9 10.0 5.9 
ASIAN 0.5 -0.5 -2.5 0.9 3.9 3.4 
  5.3 4.0 7.8 5.2 10.3 6.7 
POVERTY -10.7 -1.9 -7.6 3.7 -0.9 -0.7 
  7.7 6.1 10.5 7.7 15.8 8.6 
CONCENTRATE 4.3 3.0 0.2 0.9 4.3 7.8 
  7.4 5.2 9.8 7.2 13.1 7.9 
N 55 42 34 25 25 36 
F 17.83*** 31.52*** 4.38*** 4.45*** 6.02*** 6.66*** 
2R  0.757 0.881 0.506 0.564 0.625 0.624 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
 
The only changes from Model 1 to Model 2 are the market level conditions 
considered.  The coefficients for the product level, store level and community level 
variables remain consistent between Models 1 and 2.  If a produce item is prepackaged 
there is a significant negative impact on price for all products, except for baby spinach, 
grape tomatoes, strawberries and celery.  The only significant exception is celery, for 
which packaging results in a positive significant impact on price.   
The effects of dedicating separate sections to organic produce by a store 
(LAYOUT) became significant for more products in Model 2 than Model 1.  The 
coefficients are positive and significant for grape tomatoes, romaine lettuce, and 
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strawberries.  This implies that if a store designates separate sections to organic produce, 
there is likely to be higher retails prices for some organic produce.    
The effects of the store type indicator variables (STOPSHOP and WALMART) 
remain generally negative and significant across all products, meaning organic produce 
sold at Wal-Mart Supercenters and Super Stop and Shops are priced lower than those sold 
at Specialty stores.  The only exception of the generally negative relationship is for baby 
carrots and bananas.  The model for organic baby carrots is not statistically significant.  
Organic bananas sold at Wal-Mart Supercenters and at Super Stop and Shops have 
statistically higher prices than those sold at Specialty stores.   
 Stores with over one hundred employees (OVERONE) have statistically higher 
prices across all products, except for bananas.  Organic bananas are the only product with 
significantly lower prices in stores with more than one hundred employees. 
 The community level variables were again insignificant and inconsistent.  The 
only exceptions were for baby spinach and large red tomatoes.  Organic baby spinach 
was priced six percent less in areas with a one percent increase in African Americans and 
three percent less in areas with a one percent increase in Asians.  A change in the 
percentage of Hispanics had no significant impact on the retail price of any of the 
products sampled.  A one percent increase in the number of individuals below the poverty 
line (POVERTY) only significantly impacts the price of large red tomatoes.  Organic large 
red tomatoes are priced 37 percent lower in areas with a one percent increase in the 
number of individuals below poverty.   
 Model 2 attempts to capture the impact of the amount of competition on the retail 
price of organic produce.  When a store is in the presence of fewer than three competitors 
(CONCENTRATE) the impacts on retail price are positive for all products except baby 
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carrots and red delicious apples, however, all the coefficients are insignificant.  Thus in 
the analysis the number of competitors does not appear to have an impact on organic 
produce prices. 
Model 3 is applied to Super Stop and Shops and Specialty stores separately to 
isolate the impacts of the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters on price.  Packaged produce 
items at Super Stop and Shops have significantly lower prices across all products, except 
for grape tomatoes and bananas.  Both exceptions are insignificant.  Packaging was not 
included in the models for large red tomatoes, baby carrots, baby spinach, potatoes, 
strawberries, and celery because all of these products sampled from Super Stop and Shop 
were prepackaged.           
The Super Stop and Shops that dedicate separate sections to organic produce 
(LAYOUT) was only statistically important to the price of organic strawberries.  This 
could be due to the fact that the format for organic produce was generally consistent 
across the Super Stop and Shops sampled. 
The indicator variable depicting stores with over one hundred employees 
(OVERONE) was not included in any of the product models because all Super Stop and 
Shops included in the sample had more than one hundred employees. 
The remaining effects were inconsistent and insignificant for all products.  The 
community level variables are inconsistent and insignificant.  In addition, the presence of 
a Wal-Mart Supercenter (SUPERCENTER) is inconsistent and insignificant across all 
products sold at Super Stop and Shops.  Organic strawberries are the only exception.  The 
price of organic strawberries sold at Super Stop and Shops are priced significantly lower 
when a Wal-Mart Supercenter is present in the market.  
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Table 11. Regression Results for Model 3 Applied to Super Stop and Shops 
  
Large 
Red 
Tomatoes 
Grape 
Tomatoes
Baby 
Carrots 
Romaine
Lettuce 
Baby 
Spinach 
Red 
Delicious 
Apples 
Intercept 1.680*** 1.022*** 0.914*** 1.830*** 2.170*** 0.796*** 
  0.107 0.197 0.218 0.345 0.085 0.079 
PACKAGE  0.117   -0.391***  -0.190*** 
   0.126   0.260  0.030 
LAYOUT -0.041 0.065 -0.072 0.176 -0.066 -0.051 
  0.049 0.081 0.109 0.128 0.044 0.038 
AA -0.017 0.066 0.040 0.052 -0.016 0.026 
  0.039 0.060 0.078 0.105 0.029 0.003 
HISPANIC 0.061 -0.102 0.020 -0.060 -0.031 0.003 
  0.047 0.069 0.087 0.116 0.033 0.031 
ASIAN -0.002 0.019 -0.063 0.049 0.047 0.001 
  0.034 0.053 0.068 0.081 0.029 0.025 
POVERTY -0.147 0.026 -0.080 0.139 0.060 -0.041 
  0.069 0.104 0.135 0.175 0.054 0.048 
SUPERCENTER -0.049 0.080 -0.072 0.105 0.011 -0.026 
  0.055 0.096 0.106 0.151 0.043 0.043 
N 16.000 23.000 19.000 23.000 26.000 32 
F 1.670 0.990 0.490 0.920 0.890 8.08*** 
2R  0.211 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.615 
  
Golden 
Delicious 
Apples 
Gala 
Apples Potatoes Bananas Strawberries Celery 
Intercept 0.815*** 0.815*** -0.075* -0.136 2.010*** 1.302** 
  0.073 0.073 0.111 0.103 0.163 0.280 
PACKAGE -0.177*** -0.173***  0.107   
  0.028 0.028  0.070   
LAYOUT -0.019 -0.019 0.099 0.042 -0.122** -0.045 
  0.035 0.035 0.054 0.032 0.071 0.114 
AA 0.027 0.027 0.022 0.018 0.029 0.119 
  0.026 0.026 0.039 0.022 0.060 0.090 
HISPANIC 0.008 0.008 -0.019 -0.027 -0.065 -0.136 
  0.029 0.029 0.041 0.025 0.060 0.106 
ASIAN -0.010 -0.010 -0.020 0.055 0.007 -0.090 
  0.023 0.023 0.033 0.025 0.048 0.109 
POVERTY -0.061 -0.061 -0.083 -0.015 0.058 -0.037 
  0.045 0.045 0.070 0.039 0.102 0.141 
SUPERCENTER -0.004 -0.004 0.091 0.047 -0.013 -0.136 
  0.039 0.039 0.055 0.032 0.079 0.162 
N 32.000 32.000 18.000 18.000 18.000 14.000 
F 7.92*** 7.92*** 1.960 1.830 0.590 1.160 
2R  0.609 0.609 0.250 0.251 0.000 0.066 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
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It is important to note that the only significant models for Super Stop and Shops 
are those for red delicious, golden delicious and gala apples, all of which found only a 
significant negative impact of packaging.  This is the only robust result for Model 3 
applied to Super Stop and Shops.   
 Model 3 applied to Specialty stores results in more significant models overall.  
The models for romaine lettuce, baby spinach, red delicious apples, golden delicious 
apples, gala apples, potatoes and celery were all statistically significant.  Within these 
models, packaging of the produce items resulted in lower prices, except for baby spinach, 
which is insignificant.  Packaging was not included for celery as all the celery products 
sampled from Specialty stores were not packaged. 
 The only other significant effects across these products are for the variable 
OVERONE, indicating stores with over one hundred employees.  The coefficients are 
positive and generally significant across all the statistically important models for 
Specialty stores. 
The presence of a Wal-Mart Supercenter (SUPERCENTER) has a statistically 
significant and negative impact on prices for potatoes and baby spinach.  Therefore, the 
presence of a Wal-Mart Supercenter results in a 18 percent decrease in the price of 
organic potatoes and a 20 percent decrease in the price of organic baby spinach sold by 
Specialty stores.  This suggests that Wal-Mart Supercenters may result in lower prices on 
certain organic produce items but this effect was not observed to be widespread. 
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Table 12. Regression Results for Model 3 Applied to Specialty Stores 
  
Large 
Red 
Tomatoes 
Grape 
Tomatoes
Baby 
Carrots Romaine
Baby 
Spinach 
Red 
Delicious 
Apples 
Intercept 1.409 0.981*** 0.674** 1.618*** 1.897*** -0.131*** 
  0.681 0.335 0.312 0.541 0.299 0.309 
PACKAGE       -0.447*** 0.141 -0.153 
        0.193 0.102 0.101 
LAYOUT 0.363 -0.036 -0.236 0.201 0.114 0.207 
  0.389 0.184 0.166 0.290 0.134 0.164 
OVERONE   0.387*** 0.194 0.371 0.075 0.694*** 
    0.123 0.106 0.201 0.091 0.115 
AA 0.087 -0.122 -0.349** 0.041 0.112 0.179 
  0.444 0.188 0.163 0.282 0.132 0.157 
HISPANIC 0.258 0.198 0.418* -0.072 -0.211 -0.391 
  0.509 0.227 0.217 0.377 0.174 0.263 
ASIAN -0.260 0.041 -0.002 0.085 -0.128 0.266 
  0.188 0.106 0.106 0.182 0.086 0.149 
POVERTY -0.272 -0.163 -0.158 0.101 0.172 0.290 
  0.414 0.190 0.202 0.354 0.172 0.213 
SUPERCENTER -0.454 0.127 0.068 -0.161 -0.205** -0.116 
  0.456 0.178 0.165 0.309 0.134 0.141 
N 11.000 19.000 19.000 19.000 18.000 11 
F 2.160 2.090 0.490 3.46** 2.21* 11.15** 
2R  0.410 0.296 0.000 0.522 0.332 0.890 
  
Golden 
Delicious 
Apples 
Gala 
Apples Potatoes Bananas
Green 
Bell 
Peppers 
Celery 
Intercept 0.815** 0.061*** -0.045*** 0.249** 2.270 0.574** 
  0.073 0.500 0.167 0.526 1.020 0.270 
PACKAGE -0.177 -0.052 -0.429*** -0.209   
  0.028 0.189 0.072 0.351   
LAYOUT -0.019 0.085 0.174*** 0.419 0.728 0.156 
  0.035 0.287 0.084 0.280 0.490 0.157 
OVERONE 0.406** 1.578*** 0.394*** -0.493** -0.618 0.565*** 
  0.161 0.205 0.059 0.182 0.493 0.118 
AA 0.027 0.230 0.022 0.259  0.016 
  0.026 0.259 0.082 0.245  0.146 
HISPANIC 0.008 -0.208 -0.079 -0.329  0.024 
  0.029 0.325 0.105 0.311  0.181 
ASIAN -0.010 -0.067 0.021 -0.003  0.022 
  0.023 0.163 0.055 0.172  0.089 
POVERTY -0.061 -0.063 0.130 0.156 -0.382 0.052 
  0.045 0.303 0.109 0.313 0.610 0.166 
SUPERCENTER -0.004 0.084 -0.183** -0.275 -0.530 -0.070 
  0.039 0.303 0.096 0.291 0.661 0.161 
N 13.000 17.000 20.000 14.000 8.000 16.000 
F 11.52*** 6.88*** 31.69*** 2.000 0.790 8.95*** 
2R  0.875 0.746 0.928 0.380 0.000 0.300 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
 65
Summary 
  
 The effects of the product, store, community and market level variables are 
generally consistent across the three types of models estimated.  Prepackaged organic 
produce items are typically priced statistically lower than those not packaged.  Organic 
produce sold at stores with more than one hundred employees consistently was sold at 
higher prices.  Prices were typically lower at Super Stop and Shop stores and Wal-Mart 
Supercenters than Specialty stores.  Community variables were inconsistent and 
insignificant across all three models for the majority of the organic produce items.    
 Models 1 and 3 showed some market structure impacts on the retail price of 
organic produce.  Model 1 showed significant effects in both directions across the 
different market structures depending on the organic produce item.  Model 3 reveals the 
presence of a Wal-Mart Supercenter lowers the price of organic strawberries at Super 
Stop and Shop stores and reduces the price of brown russet potatoes and baby spinach at 
Specialty stores. The effects of the number of competitors present in a market, 
(CONCENTRATE), estimated in Model 2 were insignificant across all products.  Overall, 
market structure variables as specified here, did not have broad impacts on the observed 
organic produce prices.      
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CHAPTER 6 
 POOLED MODELS 
 To further examine possible common pricing strategies across products this 
chapter estimates price differences of groupings of similar organic products.  Two types 
of groupings are used.  The first is of similar products; for example golden delicious, red 
delicious and gala apples are pooled together to form a category apples.  The second is 
pooling similar products on a broader level, such as fruits and vegetables.  The hypothesis 
is products with similar characteristics are merchandised similarly.  The price differences 
will be interpreted in terms of product, store, community and market level attributes.  
These pooled models will be estimated using Model 1, which captures the impact of the 
four varying market structures using MKT2, MKT3, and MKT4. .    
   The common product groups to be analyzed are listed in Table 13.  The F test 
was used to test for the ability to pool these products.  The null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity of the residual variance was not rejected for the following pooled 
models.  Similar tests for leafy greens (romaine lettuce and baby spinach) and tomatoes 
(large red tomatoes and grape tomatoes), as well as for vegetables (large red tomatoes, 
grape tomatoes, baby carrots, green bell peppers and celery) as a group showed that non-
pooled (unrestricted) models were preferred to pooled (restricted) models. 
 
   Table 13.  Common Product Groupings  
Category Products Included F value 
Apples Red Delicious Apples, Golden 
Delicious Apples, and Gala 
Apples 
1.54 
Fruit Red Delicious Apples, Golden 
Delicious Apples, Gala Apples, 
Bananas 
1.65 
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 Table 14 reports the OLS log-log regression results for Model 1 applied to 
organic apples as a pooled group.  The model exhibits explanatory power of 81 percent at 
the .01 level of significance.  The interpretations for the following tables utilize 
Kennedy’s *g  transformation discussed in the previous chapter.  The transformed 
percents discussed are based on statistically significant coefficients.   
 
Table 14.  Log-log Regression Results for Apples 
Variables Coefficients 
Intercept 133.9*** 
  8.8 
PACKAGE -33.8*** 
  3.7 
LAYOUT 2.3 
  3.9 
WALMART -50.4*** 
  8.6 
STOPSHOP -42.2*** 
  5.3 
OVERONE 120.7*** 
  7.4 
AA 1.5** 
  0.63 
HISPANIC 0.17 
  0.40 
ASIAN 0.12 
  0.11 
POVERTY -1.02 
  0.82 
MKT2 -12.0** 
  5.5 
MKT3 -10.9** 
  4.8 
MKT4 -11.0 
  7.4 
N 149 
F 49.86*** 
2R  0.814 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
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 The classic F  test for restrictions implies that apples, no matter the type, are 
merchandised similarly.  The important determinants for apples are packaging, store type 
from which they are sold, the number of employees, and the percentage of African 
Americans in a community. 
The packaging of organic apples is negative and significant, meaning that 
packaged apples are priced significantly lower.  Packaged apples are priced 28 percent 
lower than those that are not packaged.   
All of the store level variables are significant, except LAYOUT, which depicts 
whether or not the retailer designates separate sections for organic produce.  The store 
type variables are negative and significant at the .01 level.  Organic apples are priced 39 
percent lower at Wal-Mart Supercenters (SUPERCENTER) and 34 percent lower at Super 
Stop and Shops (STOPSHOP) than at Specialty stores.  As expected, stores with over one 
hundred employees (OVERONE) price apples 150 percent higher. 
 All of the ethnicity variables are insignificant, except the variable depicting the 
percentage of African Americans in a community (AA).  The percent of African 
Americans has a positive impact on the price of organic apples.  POVERTY is also 
insignificant.  
   The market level impacts are consistently negative however, only two are 
significant.   Organic apples are priced 11 percent lower in markets with conventional 
and non-traditional grocers present (MKT2) and 10 percent lower in markets with 
conventional and specialty grocers (MKT3) than in markets with non-traditional, 
conventional and specialty grocers (MKT1).   This suggests organic apples are priced 
lower in markets with fewer types of competitors present.           
 69
 Table 15 reports the OLS log-log regression results for Model 1 applied to the 
fruit group including red delicious apples, golden delicious apples, gala apples and 
bananas.  The explanatory power is 29 percent at the .01 level of significance.   
Table 15. Log-log Regression Results for Fruit 
 Variables Coefficients 
Intercept 32.1*** 
  14.8 
PACKAGE -27.6*** 
  5.1 
LAYOUT -3.8 
  5.4 
WALMART -4.3 
  11.6 
STOPSHOP 1.5 
  7.2 
OVERONE 41.7*** 
  9.4 
AA 0.8 
  4.2 
HISPANIC 1.3 
  4.1 
ASIAN 2.7 
  5.0 
POVERTY -4.5 
  8.1 
MKT2 -4.8 
  7.6 
MKT3 -7.4 
  0.079 
MKT4 -7.5 
  9.9 
N 101 
F 5.98*** 
2R  0.295 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
 
 
The packaging of organic fruit has a negative and significant effect on price.  If 
the products in the fruit group are prepackaged there is an approximately 24 percent 
decrease in the retail price.  The only other significant impact on the price of these fruit 
products is the number of employees at the store from which the grouping is sold.  If a 
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store has more than one hundred employees (OVERONE) these organic fruit products 
experience a 51 percent increase in price.  This implies that larger stores have higher 
prices for organic produce.  The remaining store level, community level and market level 
variables are consistently insignificant. 
 
Summary 
  
 Product, store, community and market level variables are significant to the price 
of organic apples.  Packaging negatively impacts the price of organic apples.  Organic 
apples sold at Wal-Mart Supercenters and Super Stop and Shops are priced less than 
those at Specialty stores.  Larger stores, stores with more than one hundred employees 
sell organic apples at a higher price.  Organic apples are priced slightly higher in 
communities with a higher percentage of African Americans.  Some market structure 
impacts on the retail price of organic apples are present.  Markets 2 and 3 both show a 
negative impact on the price of organic apples.  The price of organic apples is lower in 
markets with fewer types of competitors. 
 Only packaging and store size significantly impact the price of organic fruit.  
Packaging negatively impacts the price of organic fruit.  As with apples, the stores with 
over one hundred employees charge higher prices for organic fruit than stores with fewer 
employees.       
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CHAPTER 7 
 
 CONCLUSION 
 
The primary objective of this thesis was to examine the retail pricing and 
merchandising of organic produce across traditional and non-traditional store formats in 
New England.  The secondary goal was to analyze the impacts of market structure and 
the effects of Wal-Mart Supercenters on the retail organic produce prices.  This study 
also sheds some light on the pricing strategies of Super Stop and Shop, Specialty stores, 
and Wal-Mart Supercenters, and on the responses of these grocers to different 
competitive structures. 
The findings of this thesis are consistent with those of other researchers: 
descriptive statistics show Wal-Mart Supercenters have overall lower prices than Super 
Stop and Shop and Specialty stores for organic produce.  Wal-Mart Supercenter prices 
are statistically lower than those of Super Stop and Shop for all products except grape 
tomatoes and baby carrots.  The products with the greatest significant average price 
difference between Wal-Mart Supercenters and Super Stop and Shop stores are large red 
tomatoes ($1.20) and baby spinach ($1.25).  The products with the greatest average price 
difference between Wal-Mart Supercenters and Specialty stores are celery ($0.55) and 
red and golden delicious apples ($0.50).  Several other products, such as bananas and 
potatoes, exhibit more than a $0.40 average price difference between the two store 
formats.  There are no consistent price differences between Super Stop and Shop and 
Specialty stores.   
Wal-Mart Supercenters and Super Stop and Shop stores demonstrate low 
variability in their pricing of organic produce across stores.  In contrast, Specialty stores 
exhibit high variability. 
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The differences in average retail prices across different store formats are 
explained by product, store, community and market level attributes in the econometric 
analyses.  The most significant impacts on the retail prices of organic produce were 
packaging, store type, and store size.  Regardless of store, community and market 
attributes, packaged products result in lower prices.  Typically a product sold at Super 
Stop and Shop or a Wal-Mart Supercenter had lower prices than those sold at Specialty 
stores.  Finally stores with more than one hundred employees predominately had higher 
prices.  
The number of competitors in a market is not significant in explaining the pricing 
of organic produce, while the type of competitors is significant for certain organic 
produce items.  The retail price of baby spinach, red delicious apples, golden delicious 
apples, and gala apples sold in stores within a market structure of conventional and non-
traditional grocers or conventional and specialty stores are lower than those within 
market structures of non-traditional, conventional and specialty grocers.  However, the 
price of potatoes is higher in stores within a market structure of conventional and non-
traditional grocers or conventional and specialty stores than in those within a market 
structure containing all three types of grocers.  This suggests a change in the type of 
competitors present in a market results in a change in the pricing of certain organic 
produce items.  The number of competitors and not the type was also examined and was 
found to have insignificant relationships to retail prices for any of the organic produce 
items sampled. 
The presence of a Wal-Mart Supercenter resulted in no significant effect on the 
price of organic produce items at Super Stop and Shop stores.  However, the presence of 
a Wal-Mart Supercenter was associated with an 18 percent decrease in the price of 
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organic potatoes and a 20 percent decrease in the price of organic baby spinach sold at 
Specialty stores at the one percent level of significance.  
Previous theoretical and empirical research suggests that the entry of Wal-Mart 
results in lower average prices in areas in which they operate.  In a statistical analysis, 
Global Insight 2005 concluded the expansion of Wal-Mart from the period of 1985 to 
2004 is associated with a 9% decline in food-at-home prices, a 4% decline in commodity 
prices and a 3% decline in overall consumer prices as measured by the Consumer Price 
Index.  Bianco and Zellner (2003) found that Wal-Mart Supercenters, as with 
conventional Wal-Mart stores, price their products significantly lower than their 
competitors. Volpe (2007) found that Wal-Mart Supercenters offer groceries at 
significantly lower prices than those of conventional supermarkets in New England. 
These results can be important for organic consumers.  Most national studies 
suggest higher income consumers are more likely to purchase more organic products 
(Thompson 1998).  Wal-Mart’s entry may mean that consumers in lower income brackets 
have more opportunity to purchase organic products as they become more affordable.  
Moreover, consumers of all income brackets have price incentives to choose to buy 
organics at Wal-Mart Supercenters. 
Some critics argue that lower prices at Wal-Mart may not be a consumer benefit.  
The US Bureau of Labor Statistics reports that reductions in service levels may reduce 
the positive benefit of lower prices.  Therefore, consumers are thought to pay less for less 
service.  Alternatively, benefits may be enhanced by pressure on other retailers to reduce 
prices.  Therefore, consumers benefit from direct and indirect price effects due to Wal-
Mart Supercenter entry. 
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The results also show that Wal-Mart Supercenters have low relative price 
variability, except for baby carrots, romaine lettuce, and bananas.  This implies that 
overall Wal-Mart prices its goods relatively consistently across store locations.  Super 
Stop and Shop prices also show low relative variability, except for romaine lettuce.  
Therefore, consumers can expect to pay similar prices at Wal-Mart Supercenters and 
Super Stop and Shop stores regardless of the competitive structure of the local market.  In 
contrast, Specialty store prices exhibit high relative variability.  This may be explained in 
part by the grouping of Whole Foods, Wild Oats, and Trader Joe’s stores in this category.  
The effects of market structure and competition on organic produce prices are 
generally inconsistent.  Holding constant other determinants of organic food prices, the 
type of market structure in which an organic produce item is sold significantly affects the 
pricing of baby spinach, red delicious apples, golden delicious apples, gala apples and 
potatoes.  This means that the retail prices of these products sold in stores within a market 
structure of conventional and non-traditional grocers or conventional and specialty 
grocers are lower than those within market structures of non-traditional, conventional, 
and specialty grocers.  In contrast, the retail price of potatoes sold from stores within 
market structures of conventional and non-traditional grocers or conventional and 
specialty grocers are higher than those within market structures containing all three store 
types.  Therefore, depending on the product, a change in the competitive structure will 
result in either negative or positive changes in prices experienced by consumers. 
The number of competitors in a market has no significant relationship to the retail 
price of the organic products sampled.  This result combined with the finding directly 
above leads to the conclusion that the type of competitor rather than simply the number 
of competitors drives the price of certain organic produce items.  The competitive effect 
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of the presence of Wal-Mart Supercenters does not have significant impacts on Super 
Stop and Shop’s pricing of organic produce.  However, it does significantly affect the 
pricing for a small number of products at Specialty stores. 
 Overall, this thesis contributes to the discussion of the mainstream movement of 
organic produce.  It emphasizes the importance of further quantitative analysis on the 
national level.  First, it would allow for general conclusions to be drawn about pricing 
strategies across traditional and non-traditional grocers.  Second, it would allow more 
variation in the data.  For example, the variability in community demographics and store 
attributes would be better captured through the analysis of many regions.   
 As organic sales have moved into mainstream retail markets, conventional food 
industry corporations are becoming more involved with the organic movement.  The 
corporate shift of organic produce at the retail level is likely to affect growers, suppliers, 
and handlers of organic produce.  The integrity of organic quality may be questioned with 
the transformation of the organic landscape.  Movement to the mainstream market is 
important in securing the growth of the organic market sector in the long run as long as 
product integrity in terms of compliance to organic standards is maintained.  These 
impacts must be analyzed quantitatively to contribute to the understanding of the 
mainstreaming of organics.        
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APPENDIX: LINEAR REGRESSION RESULTS 
Table A1. Linear Regression Results for Model 1 
  
Large Red 
Tomatoes 
Grape 
Tomatoes 
Baby 
Carrots 
Romaine 
Lettuce 
Baby 
Spinach 
Red 
Delicious 
Apples 
Golden 
Delicious 
Apples 
Intercept 4.817*** 1.928*** 1.722 6.449*** 7.001*** 1.578*** 1.830*** 
  0.649 0.661 0.991 1.576 1.112 0.153 0.154 
PACKAGE -1.613*** 0.255   -3.639*** 1.176 -.394*** -.408*** 
  0.467 0.531   0.879 0.725 0.057 0.059 
LAYOUT 0.069 .429* 0.428 1.041** -0.063 -0.015 -.408*** 
  0.282 0.245 0.481 0.565 0.416 0.061 0.059 
WALMART -1.401** -0.028 2.072*** -2.283** -0.54 -.321*** -.360*** 
  0.757 0.509 0.912 1.236 0.814 0.13 0.144 
STOPSHOP -0.107 -0.067 0.401 -0.026 0.823 -.395*** -.402*** 
  0.418 0.296 0.585 0.779 0.558 0.079 0.08 
OVERONE   .886** 0.067 1.894*** 1.192* .958*** .749*** 
    0.366 0.687 0.94 0.647 0.145 0.137 
AA 0.073 -0.002 0.009 0.043 -0.053 0.016 .019* 
  0.042 0.041 0.079 0.122 0.065 0.01 0.01 
HISPANIC .067** 0.005 0.035 -0.003 -0.044 -0.001 0.0006 
  0.03 0.028 0.06 0.093 0.047 0.007 0.007 
ASIAN -0.086 0.04 0.009 0.051 -.254** 0.015 -0.002 
  0.067 0.065 0.14 0.162 0.118 0.017 0.018 
POVERTY -.136** -0.005 -0.04 0.028 0.041 -0.007 -0.011 
  0.049 0.047 0.103 0.164 0.082 0.012 0.012 
MKT2 -0.079 0.265 -0.362 0.362 -0.147 -.148* -0.109 
  0.448 0.408 0.805 0.955 0.607 0.082 0.083 
MKT3 0.203 0.042 -0.208 0.168 0.704 -.153* -0.128 
  0.329 0.276 0.549 0.761 0.456 0.076 0.077 
MKT4 0.083 0.001 0.202 0.397 -0.493 -0.096 -0.111 
  0.434 0.443 0.875 1.179 0.754 0.113 0.115 
N 28 47 43 47 50 47 48 
F  5.21***  1.37  1.36  4.39***  3.01*** 15.88***   18.37*** 
2R   .631  .088  .087  .469  .329  .795  .816 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
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Table A1. Linear Regression Results for Model 1 continued 
  
Gala 
Apples Potatoes Bananas Strawberries
Green 
Bell 
Peppers
Celery 
Intercept 1.125*** 1.335*** 1.527*** 7.254*** 4.296*** 1.312* 
 0.155 0.117 0.163 1.439 0.931 0.76 
PACKAGE -.323*** -.778*** -.423*** 0.229 1.402 0.231 
 0.07 0.078 0.137 1.215 0.784 0.62 
LAYOUT 0.096 .106** 0.055 -.731* 0.249 0.397 
 0.076 0.043 0.083 0.453 0.506 0.251 
WALMART -.644*** -.440*** -.461**      
 0.161 0.091 0.187      
STOPSHOP -.427*** -0.084 -.517*** -4.756*** 2.576*** -0.29 
 0.107 0.061 0.146 0.953 0.591 0.259 
OVERONE 1.402*** .266*** .647*** 5.174***   1.312*** 
  0.125 0.06 0.121 1.052   0.347 
AA 1.66 0.008 0.008 -0.012 -0.048 0.067 
  1.202 0.008 0.013 0.067 0.073 0.04 
HISPANIC 0.06 -0.005 0.007 -0.04 0.033 -0.014 
  0.947 0.006 0.01 0.052 0.064 0.028 
ASIAN 0.714 -0.009 -0.023 0.003 -0.066 0.024 
  2.139 0.012 0.024 0.1 0.125 0.088 
POVERTY -0.718 0.006 -0.013 0.049 -0.054 -0.015 
  1.593 0.011 0.016 0.088 0.111 0.045 
MKT2 -.134* .140** 0.08 -0.401 -0.081 0.024 
  0.11 0.068 0.136 0.561 0.752 0.348 
MKT3 -.163* 0.085 0.054 -0.106 0.316 0.436 
  0.093 0.054 0.094 0.479 0.53 0.268 
MKT4 -0.18 -0.068 0.027 -0.277 0.287 0.144 
  0.144 0.093 0.146 0.639 0.751 0.411 
N 55 42 34 25 25 35 
F  19.30***  23.75***  4.05***  5.86***  6.78*** 4.30*** 
2R  .802   .869  .525  .690  .706  .538 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
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Table A2. Linear Regression Results for Model 2 
  
Large 
Red 
Tomatoes 
Grape 
Tomatoes
Baby 
Carrots 
Romaine 
Lettuce 
Baby 
Spinach
Red 
Delicious 
Apples 
Golden 
Delicious
Apples 
Intercept 5.045*** 1.854*** 1.61376 6.728*** 6.964*** 1.471*** 1.718*** 
  0.552 0.659 1.00231 1.451 1.098 0.166 0.153 
PACKAGE -1.708*** 0.324   -3.632*** 0.991 -.373*** -.396*** 
  0.406 0.494   0.852 0.725 0.057 0.059 
LAYOUT 0.053 .396* 0.452 1.085** -.093 -.036 0.011 
  0.259 0.221 0.464 0.538 0.403 0.059 0.059 
WALMART -1.604** 0.075 2*** -2.046** -1.115 -.339*** -.364*** 
  0.643 0.413 0.734 1.003 0.705 0.127 0.139 
STOPSHOP -.227 -.091 0.45 0.106 0.476 -.386*** -.398*** 
  0.073 0.266 0.528 0.682 0.539 0.08 0.079 
OVERONE   .954*** -0.018 1.854** 1.400** .988*** .800*** 
    0.353 0.667 0.909 0.655 0.15 0.135 
AA .073* -.012 0.029 0.055 -.082 .018* .019** 
  0.036 0.037 0.072 0.089 0.062 0.009 0.009 
HISPANIC .062** 0.009 0.021 -0.019 -.014 0.001 0.003 
  0.028 0.025 0.054 0.073 0.045 0.007 0.006 
ASIAN -.081 0.059 -0.032 0.009 .070 0.0004 -.010 
  0.075 0.069 0.156 0.179 0.132 0.021 0.021 
POVERTY -.127*** -.019 -0.005 0.045 -.003 -.007 -.014 
  0.044 0.041 0.091 0.125 0.077 0.011 0.011 
CONCENTRATE -.122 0.163 -0.195 -0.235 0.533 -.036 -.006 
  0.332 0.291 0.598 0.71 0.479 0.089 0.088 
N 28 47 43 47 50 47 48 
F 6.90*** 1.72 1.72 5.55*** 3.26*** 17.06*** 20.93*** 
2R   0.66 0.135 0.13 0.497 0.315 0.777 0.809
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
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Table A2. Linear Regression Results for Model 2 continued 
  
Gala Potatoes Bananas Strawberries
Green 
Bell 
Peppers 
Celery 
Intercept 1.117*** 1.420*** 1.580*** 7.199*** 4.201*** 1.288** 
 0.163 0.11 0.161 1.28 0.81 0.632 
PACKAGE -.303*** -.754*** -.416*** -.078 1.260* 0.359 
 0.069 0.079 0.131 1.152 0.721 0.396 
LAYOUT 0.074 .079* 0.053 -.848* 0.286 0.208 
 0.074 0.042 0.077 0.432 0.473 0.209 
WALMART -.649*** -.427*** .496***     1.714*** 
 0.148 0.081 0.158     0.306 
STOPSHOP -.415*** -.107** .513*** -4.903*** 2.608*** 
-
1.123*** 
 0.105 0.055 0.139 0.852 0.539 0.349 
OVERONE 1.363*** .302*** -.638*** 5.307***  -.811*** 
  0.129 0.059 0.116 0.975  0.252 
AA .019* -.002 0.006 -.022 -.051 0.012 
  0.011 0.007 0.011 0.06 0.06 0.035 
HISPANIC 0.004 0.003 0.007 -.031 0.029 0.017 
  0.008 0.005 0.009 0.044 0.053 0.025 
ASIAN -.013 0.0004 -.023 0.054 0.006 0.09 
  0.024 0.013 0.026 0.118 0.13 0.086 
POVERTY -.011 -.012 -.013 0.042 -.043 -.034 
  0.014 0.009 0.014 0.071 0.087 0.036 
CONCENTRATE -.051 0.071 -.015 0.217 0.214 0.363 
  0.096 0.049 0.099 0.485 0.52 0.245 
N 55 42 34 25 25 35 
F 21.93*** 26.81*** 5.15*** 7.95*** 9.36*** 5.56*** 
2R  0.794 0.862 0.557 0.722 0.735 0.573 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
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Table A3. Regression Results for Model 3 Applied to Super Stop and Shops 
  
Large 
Red 
Tomatoes 
Grape 
Tomatoes
Baby 
Carrots 
Romaine  
Lettuce 
Baby 
Spinach 
Red 
Delicious
Apples 
Intercept 4.772*** 2.827*** 2.214*** 7.037*** 9.244*** 2.107*** 
  0.331 0.558 0.406 1.982 0.612 0.135 
PACKAGE  0.37  -2.997*  -.396*** 
   0.478  1.637  0.068 
LAYOUT -0.186 0.388 -0.197 1.098 -0.78 -0.074 
  0.221 0.309 0.27 0.762 0.452 0.083 
AA 0.001 0.002 0.024 0.117 -0.025 0.021 
  0.034 0.053 0.041 0.132 0.067 0.013 
HISPANIC 0.04 -0.015 -0.008 -0.078 -0.062 0.003 
  0.024 0.036 0.028 0.103 0.042 0.009 
ASIAN -0.011 0.006 -0.022 0.071 0.115 -0.001 
  0.059 0.074 0.068 0.186 0.11 0.021 
POVERTY -0.082 -0.003 0.005 0.129 0.081 -0.012 
  0.037 0.053 0.045 0.165 0.069 0.014 
SUPERCENTER -0.314 0.189 -0.168 0.74 0.253 -0.044 
  0.243 0.375 0.281 0.887 0.445 0.092 
N 15 23 19 23 26 32 
F 1.78 .61 .37 .91 .84 6.24*** 
Adjusted 2R  .238 .001 .002 .002 .003 .541 
  
Golden 
Delicious 
Apples 
Gala 
Apples Potatoes Bananas Strawberries Celery 
Intercept 2.099*** 2.099*** .861*** .867*** 7.69*** 3.575*** 
 0.13 0.13 0.092 0.115 0.784 0.757 
PACKAGE -.372*** -.372***  0.075   
 0.065 0.065  0.086   
LAYOUT -0.02 -0.02 .099** 0.042 -0.856 -0.014 
 0.08 0.08 0.052 0.032 0.5 0.386 
AA .023* .023* -0.005 0.005 -0.033 0.043 
  0.013 0.013 0.01 0.004 0.097 0.073 
HISPANIC 0.004 0.004 0.004 -0.0007 -0.042 -0.016 
  0.009 0.009 0.006 0.003 0.055 0.073 
ASIAN -0.006 -0.006 0.001 0.012 0.032 -0.188 
  0.02 0.02 0.013 0.011 0.13 0.219 
POVERTY -0.015 -0.015 -0.013 -0.004 0.063 -0.034 
  0.014 0.014 0.01 0.005 0.089 0.064 
SUPERCENTER -0.002 -0.002 0.067 0.041 -0.125 -0.316 
  0.089 0.089 0.056 0.032 0.545 0.462 
N 32 32 18 18 18 14 
F 5.99*** 5.99*** 1.31 1.18 .51 .34 
2R  .529 .529 .099 .068 .002 .004 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
 
 
 81
Table A4. Regression Results for Model 3 Applied to Specialty Stores 
  
Large 
Red 
Tomatoes 
Grape 
Tomatoes
Baby 
Carrots 
Romaine 
Lettuce 
Baby 
Spinach 
Red 
Delicious 
Apples 
Intercept 4.476 2.395** 1.675*** 6.245* 7.873*** 0.667 
  2.332 1.12 0.416 3.266 2.176 0.287 
PACKAGE    -3.859** 1.503 -.435* 
     1.42 0.962 0.134 
LAYOUT -2.784 -0.168 -0.218 1.48 1.468 0.618 
  4.735 0.827 0.3 2.308 1.32 0.262 
OVERONE 4.209 1.140* 0.341 1.573 0.469 .751** 
  4.509 0.544 0.192 1.575 0.87 0.189 
AA 0.037 -0.061 -0.029 0.016 -0.026 0.065 
  0.18 0.116 0.042 0.304 0.184 0.033 
HISPANIC 0.237 0.102 0.047 0.038 -0.227 -0.097 
  0.225 0.102 0.04 0.296 0.178 0.036 
ASIAN -0.085 0.043 0.007 0.165 -0.398 .175* 
  0.147 0.142 0.059 0.427 0.262 0.059 
POVERTY -0.493 -0.077 -0.023 0.035 0.208 0.073 
  0.536 0.101 0.045 0.338 0.216 0.03 
SUPERCENTER 3.476 0.602 0.291 -0.712 -3.11** -0.2 
  6 0.746 0.288 2.38 1.27 0.167 
N 11 19 18 19 18 11 
F 3.21 1.35 .78 2.68* 2.41 22.52** 
Adjusted 2R  .607 .118 .009 .427 .398 .945 
  
Golden 
Delicious 
Apples 
Gala 
Apples Potatoes Bananas 
Green 
Bell 
Peppers 
Celery 
Intercept 1.782** .941* 1.332*** 1.723** 7.025* 0.813 
  0.488 0.466 0.186 0.59 2.792 1.052 
PACKAGE -.614* -0.225 -.770*** -0.224  0.562 
  0.272 0.221 0.1 0.529  0.484 
LAYOUT 0.19 0.232 .247* 0.286 2.766 0.62 
  0.386 0.36 0.124 0.452 2.085 0.708 
OVERONE 0.504 1.382*** .196** -.694* -3.202 1.269** 
  0.413 0.254 0.088 0.292 2.089 0.527 
AA 0.013 0.037 0.002 -0.006  0.024 
  0.056 0.043 0.017 0.057  0.088 
HISPANIC -0.01 -0.03 -0.009 -0.008  0.028 
  0.052 0.041 0.015 0.055  0.075 
ASIAN 0.024 0.003 0.0003 -0.027  0.054 
  0.083 0.062 0.024 0.081  0.108 
POVERTY 0.01 0.006 0.02 -0.005 -0.339 0.043 
  0.049 0.049 0.02 0.061 0.497 0.087 
SUPERCENTER -0.089 -0.034 -0.248 -0.425 -2.14 -0.232 
  0.31 0.37 0.139 0.433 2.807 0.649 
N 13 17 20 14 8 16 
F 7.74** 11.59*** 19.13*** 1.00 .65 5.03** 
2R  .817 .841 .884 .001 .002 .682 
***: Difference is significant at the .01 level **: Significant at the .05 level                            
*: Significant at the .10 level 
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